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Symposium: Are Certain Knowledge Frameworks More 
Congenial to the Aims of Cross-Cultural Philosophy?* 
————————————————————- 
In her essay, “Global Knowledge Frameworks and the Tasks of Cross-Cultural Philosophy,” Leigh Jenco proposes 
that certain knowledge frameworks may, in virtue of their accessibility to erstwhile outsiders, be more congenial to the 
aims of cross-cultural philosophy. Her co-symposiasts use Jenco’s essay to further the discussion on different aspects of 
this claim. Steve Fuller contests whether postcolonialism is the right lens through which cross-cultural encounters 
should be studied. David H. Kim suggests that an inclusive multifactorial account of frameworks relevant to 
cross-cultural philosophy may be more apt for the aims of this sub-discipline. Thaddeus Metz seeks to provide reason 
to doubt Jenco’s self-transformative conception, and also advance another, pluralist conception of knowledge. Miljana 
Milojevic reinterprets Jenco’s knowledge frameworks as different conceptualizations of knowledge used in attempts to 
justify the neglect of non-Western traditions.  
  
Key words: African philosophy; cross-cultural inquiry; fallibilism; knowledge-frameworks; 
multiculturalism; non-western philosophy; postcolonialism; objectivism; self-transformation 
 
 
Global Knowledge Frameworks and the Tasks of Cross-Cultural Philosophy 
 
LEIGH JENCO  
London School of Economics, UK (l.k.jenco@lse.ac.uk) 
 
 
In this short essay, I want to suggest that there may be certain knowledge frameworks that are relatively 
more congenial to the aims of cross-cultural philosophy. By that I mean specifically that certain 
frameworks may present knowledge as more accessible to its erstwhile outsiders than do other kinds of 
knowledge frameworks. This openness, in turn, has implications for how and whether knowledge might 
be “provincialized”—that is, recognized as one possibility among other rival alternatives, rather than as 
the only form of true knowledge.1 I see provincialization as crucially important, if not sufficient, for 
cross-cultural philosophy because only this premise makes it possible to acknowledge the value, and not 
only mere existence, of foreign bodies of thought. Indeed, it might be said that only with 
provincialization might one come to see unfamiliar bodies of thought as philosophy at all (rather than as, 
say, strange rituals or concepts with no relation to the higher forms of reflection we associate with 
philosophy).2 But this very commitment to provincialization also requires that we turn the gaze back 
upon cross-cultural philosophy itself, and reverse the question: is cross-cultural philosophy congenial to 
all globally extant knowledge frameworks? My discussion below suggests that it can be so only if we 
admit that the practice of “cross-cultural philosophy” itself may need to change in order to take account  
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of various modes of global knowledge. And at least one of the frameworks I outline below, I think, offers 
us a way to do that.  
I outline four basic knowledge frameworks that I associate, quite crudely, with various 
globally-situated traditions of thought. (I must note that in this short essay, I provide nothing like the 
kind of historical evidence sufficient to tie these basic approaches to the specific examples that inspire my 
formulation of them, but I do indicate some of the sources across space and time in which they may be 
located: these include not only modern academic knowledge forms but also communal practices, oral 
traditions, and literary corpuses that may or may not be typically associated with “philosophy.”) The first 
framework derives from esoteric traditions that limit the scope of who may have knowledge of what. The 
second framework, associated with the Enlightenment, argues that knowledge is universal and unitary, 
and thereby in principle available to anyone. The third derives from 19th and 20th century European 
philosophy about culture, which claims that knowledge remains embedded in particular historical 
background conditions and so remains diverse and particular. The fourth derives from basic Chinese 
presuppositions which see differently-situated knowledge as acquirable by outsiders given a specific 
commitment to self-transformation.  
The first two kinds of knowledge frameworks are discussed frequently in postcolonial scholarship, 
which (among other things) attempts to elucidate how imperial formations of knowledge production elide, 
transform, or interact with indigenous forms of knowledge.3 For a particularly relevant illustration of 
these frameworks, we might turn to Sanjay Seth’s discussion of British educational policy in colonial India, 
in which he makes the following observation:  
 
Modern knowledge, for all its diversity, is unitary, which is why its transmission can be organized 
according to degree of difficulty—primary, secondary and tertiary, but in principle accessible to all. 
By contrast, in India, knowledge was always in the plural, always took the form of so many 
knowledges and practices: esoteric and restricted knowledges accessible only to some social groups, 
‘practical’ and more widely available knowledges, variations according to caste and region and 
religion, and none of all this organized as an ‘educational system.’ Collectively this yielded a riotous 
variety of knowledge practices, from unstructured and occasional ones to more structured 
‘institutions’ such as maktabs and madrassas and tols and pyal ‘schools,’ and patshalas and others (Seth 
2007: 678). 
 
Seth notes multiple kinds of knowledge frameworks in this passage, but I would like to emphasize two: 
first, the view that some kinds of knowledge are accessible only to certain social groups; and second, the 
view that knowledge, being unitary, is transmittable to all.  
The first, the esoteric framework, is associated with a range of global traditions ranging from 
Brahmanical exegesis to Islamic jurisprudence.4 The idea here is that only certain individuals or groups 
might access or advance a certain form of knowledge due to their special qualification or standing—such 
as their caste, social status, level of moral cultivation, etc. Esoteric knowledge frameworks may present 
obvious problems for cross-cultural philosophy because their very nature—whether in the form of texts, 
orally transmitted material, rituals, or forms of participatory practice—limits their circulation beyond a 
small coterie of suitably qualified individuals. If the claim is made that only Muslims, for example, have 
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the authority or right to interpret the Quran, or Christians the New Testament, then such texts would be 
off limits to a significant number of professional philosophers. As such, the ideas those texts contain, and 
the practices they shape, would be difficult to bring within broader rubrics of comparison that would 
require at least some minimal familiarity with the substantive content of the knowledge they advance. 
Significantly, however, esoteric frameworks do not necessarily preclude all cross-cultural engagement: 
existing insiders may avail themselves of cross-cultural engagement, or outsiders in some cases may 
become insiders through long-term dedicated practice.5 Further still, there may be profound internal 
disagreement within such frameworks about who counts as an insider, what counts as knowledge, and 
whether there might be a need to police such sharp boundaries at all.6 
Regardless, engaging such esoteric frameworks would require a substantial shift in how 
cross-cultural philosophers pursue their work, if they are to respect “insider” prohibitions. Because of the 
dedication involved in acquiring suitable qualifications before knowledge can be acquired or imparted, in 
at least some cases philosophers would need to abandon the largely academic pursuit of abstract 
knowledge, and come to see knowledge more as anthropologists do: as embodied in particular 
communities in which the philosopher must acquire membership—if, that is, membership is even 
acquirable at all, and not endowed through birthright or other forms of qualification beyond the control 
of one individual. This is why the ambitious claim that philosophers can and should somehow “alternate 
between an internal immersion in the lived experience of texts or ideas and an external stance of 
commentary and exegesis” (Godrej 2011: 23) would falter in the face of such esoteric frameworks of 
knowledge: first, in mandating an “external stance” it fails to recognize the terms under which “internal” 
esoteric knowledge can claim status as knowledge per se; that is, esoteric knowledge can be equally 
generative of reflection and “exegesis” as established academic disciplines—even if it requires more or 
different kinds of engagement than typical academic knowledge. Second, such a claim also fails to 
recognize the conditions placed by knowers on the transmission of their knowledge to others, the lifelong 
commitment often required to acquire such knowledge in the first place, and the transformations such 
commitment may induce in the knower herself.  
As Seth notes in the context of colonial India, such esoteric forms of knowledge presented “a 
different relation between knowledge and knower” than did the British colonial education system, which 
turned on a version of the universalist Enlightenment view that saw knowledge as premised on a Kantian 
subjectivity in which “only that which is independently acquired and sustained by personal conviction,” 
rather than by something like revelation or deference to authority, “counts as knowledge” (Seth 2007: 
676). This second, “Enlightenment” framework seems to offer a corrective to the esoteric view. In seeing 
knowledge as available to all, the Enlightenment framework seems to ensure emancipation of those who 
have been prevented—by ignorance, social status, political domination, or customary oppression—from 
gaining and using knowledge for learning about their world.7 However, this framework has been 
criticized for placing constraints, not on who may have capacities to obtain such knowledge, but on what 
counts as knowledge itself. In the history of European colonial expansion and justification, the premise of 
Enlightenment reason has been used famously to simultaneously condemn empire while also requiring 
colonized people to develop their rational faculties suitably before they would be fit for self-rule.8 In this 
framework, the various forms of knowledge described by Seth in the passage above, in which what we 
know is mediated and constituted by a huge range of social, religious, and political authorities, or which is 
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derived from faith or revelation, would not qualify as knowledge worthy of the name. On this framework, 
or indeed any framework which claims its knowledge as singular, unified and uniquely true, 
provincialization is by definition impossible. Cross-cultural philosophy would be reduced to comparing 
local variations of a given set of universal principles or forms of knowledge already known to the 
investigator.    
For these reasons, scholars wishing to acknowledge the broad forms that knowledge might take 
among humans as meaning-making beings have turned to yet a third framework, which we might call the 
embedded one. This framework sees knowledge not as disembodied but as deeply embedded in the social 
practices that give it meaning: knowledge is thus not “about an independent object, but one that is partly 
constituted by self-understanding” (Taylor 1985a: 98). This method has clear connections to the modes 
of biblical exegesis advanced by German hermeneuticists such as Hans-Georg Gadamer.9 Like Gadamer, 
many adherents of this view turn to dialogue as a means of elucidating, for differently-situated others, the 
value and meaning of knowledge from other contexts. As James Tully has explained in a recent 
contribution to this Journal, the 
 
mutual understanding and judgment that can be achieved in dialogues of reciprocal elucidation is 
neither a comprehensive view nor a consensus. It consists in bringing to light background forms 
and ways of thought and being from various traditions and becoming able to view and discuss 
them comparatively from different limited perspectives. They become meaningful for the 
participants. This is what Gadamer calls the ‘fusion of horizons’ and Bohm describes as exposing 
and sharing of tacit meanings in common in dialogue. The diverse forms and ways of thought and 
being are no longer isolated and foreign. They are meaningful precisely because the participants have 
elucidated the webs of similarities and dissimilarities (family resemblances) that connect them in 
their diversity (Tully 2016: 67).  
 
Although Tully’s explanation seems to promote the embedded framework, and the dialogic method, as 
distinctively suited to cross-cultural philosophy, his description here ironically betrays its own limitations. 
Dialogue makes foreign ways of life “meaningful to the participants” not through a transfer of knowledge 
among participants, but only through the extended exposure to some emergent common meaning—what 
Charles Taylor, in an earlier masterful elaboration of the dialogic method, called a “language of 
perspicuous contrast,” in which “we formulate both their way of life and ours as alternative possibilities 
in relation to human constraints at work in both” (Taylor 1985c: 125). Although itself potentially 
transformative and generative of knowledge, this “third space” ultimately enhances our self-reflexivity 
through the elucidation of similarities and differences of our way of life with that of others; by definition 
it does not enable us to understand or be transformed by the knowledge known by the other. On this 
basis, in fact, postcolonial and other theorists have argued for an extremely constrained capacity for 
cross-cultural learning: our own embeddedness in background conditions makes it impossible for us to 
grasp the knowledge of differently-embedded others in the same way we presumably grasp our “own” 
knowledge. In extreme cases of “subalternity,” the profound marginalization of other ways of life even 
makes it impossible for the knowledge they produce to become part of our own modern worldview on 
equal terms: “The antihistorical, antimodern subject, therefore, cannot speak as ‘theory’ within the 
Journal of World Philosophies  Symposium/86 
 
_______________	
Journal	of	World	Philosophies	2	(Winter	2017):	82–145	
Copyright	©	Leigh	Jenco,	Steve	Fuller,	David	H.	Kim,	Thaddeus	Metz	and	Miljana	Milojevic.	 	
e-ISSN:	2474-1795	•	http://scholarworks.iu.edu/iupjournals/index.php/jwp•	doi:	10.2979/jourworlphil.2.2.05	
 
knowledge procedures of the university even when these knowledge procedures acknowledge and 
‘document’ its existence” (Chakrabarty 2000: 41). 
It is not my intention here to criticize the dialogic method for its limitations, which I have done 
extensively elsewhere. My point is rather to show the extent to which such a dialogic method, and the 
“embedded” framework of knowledge it hopes to serve, both presume that forms of knowledge to some 
extent cannot be shared among participants to a dialogue in the same way that (presumably) they can be 
shared among those who already participate in one’s “background forms of life and ways of thought” (to 
use Tully’s phrase). Although the dialogic method is often promoted as a means of breaking down binary 
oppositions between “them” and “us,” its very function within cross-cultural philosophy presumes that 
such a division exists. This mirrors in some way the constraints of the first framework, in which those 
who are not already in possession of certain knowledge (“outsiders”) cannot come to possess it as fully as 
those who already have it (“insiders.”)  
There may be an alternative to this view, however, if we recognize that the background 
conditions which give rise to embedded knowledge are themselves tractable to collective and individual 
attempts to transform them. In other work, I have identified this fourth, “self-transformative” framework 
with the efforts of late nineteenth and early twentieth century Chinese intellectuals to produce what they 
called “Western learning” (Xi xue).10 To intellectuals such as Yan Fu (1985), it was both possible and 
desirable to acquire Western knowledge, through replication and participation in those “Western” forms 
of life that supported such knowledge and made it meaningful. For Yan and his colleagues, this 
replication of the social practices that produced certain kinds of knowledge was not the work of one 
individual, but rather happened collectively over many generations, through the construction of durable 
institutions, transformation of values over time, and alterations in the languages and forms of inquiry. 
This framework has deep precedents in certain Chinese perspectives on the acquisition of civilizational 
identity as identical to the acquisition of certain forms of knowledge: acquiring knowledge of Chinese 
practices, rituals and texts essentially makes one “Chinese.”11 Similar presuppositions about the nature of 
knowledge production and acquisition also seem to have been at work also in the early modern Sanskrit 
cosmopolis, as described by Sheldon Pollock (2000: 591). 
Although such a framework has historically supported forms of cultural chauvinism,12 it also 
offers attractive features that combines the strengths of the other frameworks: it views knowledge as 
socially embedded, yet capable of circulating beyond its original contexts of production; it sets conditions 
upon the acquisition of knowledge, yet sees those conditions as malleable over time and across human 
efforts. For these reasons, this framework out of all of them may be the most congenial to the practice of 
cross-cultural philosophy, because it provides a method by which knowledge might be transmitted 
without at the same time claiming that knowledge is unitary. That is, it offers guidance as to the object 
and method of acquiring knowledge, making comparison and thus provincialization possible. But this can 
only be the case if we open philosophy itself—including the material and social conditions which sustain 
it—to transformation on the basis of other differently-situated practices. The self-transformative 
framework does not necessarily offer guidance as to what forms of knowledge we should pursue or on 
what basis we should transform ourselves; but it leaves open the exciting possibility that the acquisition of 
such knowledge is possible—on the condition that we be willing to (sometimes radically) change 
ourselves, as well as our view of knowledge, in the process.  
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By saying that such an approach is most congenial to the aims of cross-cultural philosophy, I am 
staking out an identity for that form of philosophy as a dynamic, open-ended, and most importantly 
self-transformative process rather than, say, a body of work or even approach to knowledge. This 
self-transformative process is constituted, not by the elaboration of a “third space of contrast” produced 
by the dialogic method, but by the consideration that we can learn and be transformed by 
differently-situated knowledge. In other words, I am also trying to turn the question about the “aims” of 
that philosophy on its head: on what basis, in whose community, and for what purpose do we determine 
the aims of a given body of thought? And what do we do if, as may be possible, philosophy is simply not 
capacious enough a term or practice to contain all of the world’s approaches to knowledge? Once we 
transform ourselves, might we then have different forms of knowledge at our disposal, but also a 
different identity as “knowers,” in a community very different from the (presumably modern and 
academic) one in which we began?  
 
                                                
*  I would like to thank Monika Kirloskar-Steinbach and Amy Donahue for their insightful comments on an 
earlier version of this essay. Any errors that remain are, of course, my own. 
1 I take this idea of provincialization from Chakrabarty (2000). 
2 Here I follow Roxanne Euben (2006: 10) to take “unfamiliar” in a relative sense, “not an instant property or 
possession” but rather a polarity that transforms in the course of the journey itself.  
3 E.g., Cohn (1996).  
4 For an overview of global traditions of canonical exegesis, and the qualifications they place upon interpreters, 
see Henderson (1991). 
5 An example of the latter is Kristofer Schipper, whose ethnographic work among Taoist masters in Tainan led 
to his ordination as one himself. See Schipper (1993).  
6 Mohammed Fadel (1997), for example, surveys such a debate over Quranic interpretation. 
7 The classic statement of this view is of course Kant (1983). 
8 e.g., Mill (1991).  
9 Gadamer (1989); Taylor (1985b). 
10 Jenco (2015). 
11 Ping-ti Ho (1998). 
12 Crossley (1990). 
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Is There More to Cross-Cultural Philosophy Than Fear of Culture Change? 
Response to Jenco  
 
STEVE FULLER 
University of Warwick (s.w.fuller@warwick.ac.uk)  
 
 
The principal merit of Jenco’s piece is its literal-mindedness. She takes quite literally the idea that a 
“cross-cultural philosophy” presupposes the separate but equal existence of cultures, across which one 
might travel mentally and physically. Moreover, the cross-cultural philosopher always engages in this 
project coming from one of these cultures, which then frames that person’s understanding of the other 
cultures that he or she “visits.” I have considerable sympathy with this approach, which I have pursued in 
terms of time travel between members of what is ostensibly the same historical lineage, whereby 
presumed progenitors visit their presumed descendants and vice versa to contest a common normative 
resource, namely, epistemic authority.1 The twist in Jenco’s argument comes as a critique of the 
“dialogical” approach to such visits, whereby the most that one expects to achieve is a meaningful 
understanding of the differences between one’s own and the other’s culture. Jenco believes that this sets 
the bar for successful cross-cultural philosophy too low. Instead she believes that we should aspire to be 
changed by the cultures we visit, so that the philosopher shifts from simply being embedded in one 
culture to embodying cross-culturalism in his or her being.  
Expressed at this level of abstraction, I couldn’t agree more. Yet, curiously Jenco’s model here is 
a version of what international relations theorists call “defensive modernization,” a cultural 
self-immunization strategy—Jenco somewhat romantically calls it “self-transformation”—whereby from 
the nineteenth century onward, Chinese intellectuals became sufficiently adept at Western ways that the 
nation managed its own transition to modernity without succumbing to Western forces in the manner of 
others who became the subjects of imperial expansion.2 At the same time, more so than Japan and often 
in direct opposition to Japan’s more open embrace of Western culture, the most ancient and distinctive 
elements of Chinese culture remained palpably in the process. Native philosophies such as Confucianism 
and Taoism have been quite potent checks on the reach of more alien cultural trends, including the 
Chinese variant of Marxism. Indeed, the phrase “Chinese culture” would not be so resonant today as 
implying inter alia “Non-western,” were it not for the success of this strategy.  
To be sure, the Chinese mode of defensive modernization has included quite a lot of creative 
variation, not least by the two intellectuals from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries on whom Jenco 
herself has worked, Yan Fu and Zhang Shizhao. But this leads me immediately to question whether Jenco 
does justice to the “esoteric” tradition of cross-cultural philosophy, which she identifies in large measure 
only to dismiss. After all, it is clear even from her own account of the exchange that these two 
intellectuals shared about the finer points of Rousseau interpretation in 1914–15, only a few years after 
China’s republican revolution, that they were using Rousseau’s text as a pretext for discussing 
contemporary Chinese political issues, not least the people’s capacity for self-rule.3  
What Yan and Zhang were doing was very much in the spirit of the esoteric appropriation of 
alien texts. They were using Rousseau in this case—but they used other Western texts on other 
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occasions—as a platform for discussing matters that had previously lacked voice in Chinese culture, 
perhaps because they believed that their open discussion would irrevocably destabilize the social order. 
What I would call the “Extended West” (i.e. the Abrahamic tradition, including Islam) has tended to treat 
such platform texts as occupying a “sacred” domain reserved to theologians and jurists for authoritative 
interpretation, which amounts to a kind of ventriloquism whereby the undiscussable can be discussed by 
proxy. Here it is worth recalling that most of the language in which the Bible was written was alien to the 
Roman culture which in fourth century AD made Christianity the official medium for channeling 
authority. For their part, Muslims can be credited with having turned Greek philosophy and science into 
the foundation of Western civilization by reintroducing them to the Roman world in Arabic translation 
with a transcendent authority that those Greek texts had lacked in their Mediterranean homeland.4   
In the secular era, we call such platform texts “metaphysics” or “mythology,” depending on how 
much we identify with them: I do metaphysics but you, my opponent, practice mythology. (Leo Strauss 
acutely realized this point as a literal lesson from history for today’s aspiring rulers. An intellectually 
flat-footed yet “academically correct” version of the same point was made in Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy 
of symbolic forms5.) In either case, a text imported from the outside is turned into a virtual field of 
engagement—what literary critics call “allegory”—in which insiders can map and transact their 
differences, safe from the effects of doing this in the insiders’ native medium. Think of esotericism as a 
low-tech anticipation of “Second Life,” but with a long-term intention of looping back into the conduct 
of life in the actual world.  
My point here is that while it is of course true, as Jenco says, that esotericism promotes a double 
or even multiple truth doctrine, the epistemologically interesting cross-cultural point is that an alien text, 
whose superiority to native texts may or may not be explicitly granted, becomes the pretext for natives to 
transact their differences on matters that native discursive formations prohibit or impede. Moreover, if 
the esotericists see any of these differences as a potential source of empowerment even to those not privy 
to their hermeneutical games, there will be an incentive to educate people in these alien texts. What I have 
in mind here is the revolutionary role that calls to teach the Bible played starting with the Protestant 
Reformation, which was repeated in a more focused but no less powerful way by the drives to teach the 
Marxist corpus at the end of the nineteenth and throughout most of the twentieth century.6 
However, conspicuous by its absence from Jenco’s general argument—and the conceptual matrix 
from which it emerges—is the prospect that the cross-cultural philosopher may actually try to persuade 
another culture to replace its own ideas and practices with those of the philosopher. In effect, proselytism 
of the sort that has characterized missionary work in the histories of Christianity and Islam—and their 
modern secular offspring, science—seems to be ruled out. What I mean by “proselytism” is a 
combination of claims that constitute a “universalist” mind-set:  
 
• One’s own ideas and practices are good not only for oneself but also for everyone who has yet to 
possess them.  
• The benefit that accrues to any individual who adopts those ideas and practices increases as more 
people adopt them, with the full benefit received once everyone adopts them. 
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• The above two claims are usually advanced as both articles of faith and testable hypotheses. In 
other words, the cross-cultural philosopher in proselytizing mode is always undergoing a “trial by 
faith.” We prove the value of our own beliefs by proving them to others.  
 
Jenco’s omission of proselytism may have to do with the role of missionary work in constructing the 
platform on which capitalist imperialism was launched, which Marxists inspired by Lenin then repurposed 
as Soviet imperialism, the politically deconstructed version of which—as mediated by world-systems 
theory—survives in the sense of “globalism” that permeates the “post-colonialism” from which Jenco 
now launches her own argument. And maybe this chain of causation—or perhaps recycling—explains 
proselytism’s conspicuous absence from Jenco’s argument. It would amount to a “return of the repressed,” 
for reasons that will be made clear below.  
The closest that Jenco comes to acknowledging proselytism as a form of cross-cultural philosophy is 
in her discussion of the “Enlightenment” option, which she rightly characterizes as a second-order move 
by the philosopher to find a common framework in which one’s own and the other’s culture can be 
transacted in a manner that is fair to both sides. She is also right that many of the Enlightenment thinkers 
condemned imperialism at the same time they advised the subjects of imperialism to adopt the 
imperialist’s ways. However, this is less paradoxical than it seems. In fact, these Enlightenment thinkers 
believed in proselytism—and expected to receive proselytism in return. And it would be from the ensuing 
give-and-take of competing proselytisms that a universal translation scheme or “language of thought” 
would result. This was the spirit in which Leibniz and other early modern philosophers approached the 
potential contribution of Chinese ideograms to the construction of this universal language. However, 
most of these encounters ended up happening only in the Enlightenment thinkers’ minds. Indeed, much 
to the puzzlement of Christian missionaries in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, their Chinese 
hosts were not nearly as keen to convert them as the Westerners were to convert the Chinese.7 I shall 
return to this point shortly. 
History has also presented a more bottom-up approach to constructing a framework in which 
multiple cultures can transact their perspectives. It follows the pattern of a pidgin, a trading language, 
which evolves into a creole and ultimately a grammatically closed language, something exportable in its 
own right.8 That was exactly how Arabic became the first cross-culturally valid language that explicitly 
aimed to communicate a universal message in both spiritual and secular terms.9 The process should be 
familiar to smartphone users who are provided with a platform—in this case the Arabic-based 
Qur’an—that is also used to support a number of useful apps, namely, the Arabic translation of major 
Greek works that would have otherwise required a mastery of Greek. The “platform + apps” approach 
was subsequently tried by the Christian missionaries, who argued that Christianity’s metaphysical 
world-view could be of substantial material benefit to the Chinese.  
But of course, proselytism has faced many obstacles along the way, the main one being that the 
target audiences do not understand or accept the proselytizer’s terms of engagement—which, in the first 
instance, is about exchange relations. One assumption shared by proselytizers and capitalists, which made 
imperialism possible, is that trade is inherently good, as it enriches both parties. This mentality took a 
particular form in the early modern period. If people have made the effort to come a long distance, often 
suffering many hardships along the way, then the host culture is obliged to respect that fact by engaging 
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with what the visitors find of value through some act of incorporation.10 But of course, a much more 
moderate response is possible, one which avoids the need for exchange. It simply involves providing 
hospitality to the visitors until they decide to return home. In that case, the host allows a space for the 
visitors to express themselves but without any expectation that the host will be changed by the experience, 
other than perhaps be entertained or intrigued. This is closer to the default Chinese position, and also 
helps to explain their defensive modernization stance in more recent times, including its recourse to 
esotericism.  
Underlying this more diplomatic response to proselytism is a privileging of difference over change as 
the regulative ideal for the cultural handling of foreign agents. This bias carries over into contemporary 
postcolonialism, with which Jenco wishes to align herself. It tends to prefer relatively strict forms of 
multicultural accommodation, including a certain measure of self-segregation and nostalgic 
revivalism—as opposed to the maintenance of a dominant regime that fosters the hybridization of 
cultural identities which may in the long term dissipate whatever resistance those cultures originally posed 
to the dominant regime. I prefer things the other way around.  
But even Jenco must admit that postcolonialism is a strange if not hypocritical vehicle for dealing 
with these matters. After all, postcolonialism was inspired by Edward Said’s problematization of 
“Orientalism” as a way in which Western humanists came to terms with Islam, starting in the 
Enlightenment. Said rightly cast the “othering” of Islam—which launched the modern West-East 
dichotomy—as largely motivated by what the West feared as its own (decadent) fate if it did not shore up 
its own sense of mission, purpose and values. The poignancy of this fear came from the fact that 
Westerners always knew that these so-called “Orientals” were their cultural siblings, two products of the 
same universalist beliefs and global aspirations which went their separate ways over the centuries. To be 
sure, “postcolonialism” is now used in a very broad way to cover cultures that have little if any historical 
affiliation with Europe, such as China and so-called “indigenous” cultures. Yet, postcolonialism’s 
universalist theoretical ambitions, high humanist style of expression, and celebrity academic status makes, 
say, Dipesh Chakrabarty’s11 attempt to “provincialize Europe” a worthy holder of a place that was 
previously occupied by the Western Orientalists who provincialized, say, Egypt, Turkey or Iran—and 
whom Said had spent his academic career railing against.  
                                                
1 Fuller (2015: chap. 6). 
2 On the varieties of “defensive modernization” practiced by Russia, Turkey, Egypt, China and Japan, see 
Ralston (1990).  
3 Jenco (2010: 54-6). 
4 Montgomery (2000: chaps. 3–4).  
5 On Strauss’ differences from Cassirer, see his review of the latter’s final work: Strauss (1947: 125–27). On 
Strauss’ method, see Melzer (2014).  
6 The best sociological account of this modus operandi is Wuthnow (1989).  
7 Ryan (1991). 
8 Fuller, and Collier (2004: chap. 2).  
9 Montgomery (2000: chap. 3). 
10 Gong (1984).  
11 Chakrabarty (2000). 
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Over the last several years, Leigh Jenco has been advancing the discussion of comparative methodology 
and of twentieth century Chinese and comparative political theory in particular.1 I have learned from her 
previous scholarship, so I value this opportunity to reflect upon her essay, a compelling think piece, on 
whether certain epistemic frameworks facilitate comparative philosophy better than others. After quickly 
reconstructing her account, I suggest that in spite of her criticisms of the dialogical approach to 
comparative philosophy, her guiding concerns seem nonetheless to require a vital role for dialogical 
inquiry. If this is right, then the distance shrinks between what she calls the “culturally embedded” 
perspective and the one that she favors, the “self-transformation” account, and the insights of each can 
be more helpfully conceptualized in terms of an inclusive multifactorial account rather than the 
differentiating taxonomy that she offers. 
Before turning to her account, I offer a few words about comparative philosophy that may 
accommodate many kinds of relevant projects. Comparative philosophy aims at the very least to bridge 
prima facie disparate traditions of philosophy, that is, traditions of philosophy that appear to each other 
to have some notable measure of difference in virtue of arising out of or being constituted by different 
lifeworlds or ways of life of peoples. These worlds or ways include such conceptually generative factors as 
cultures, languages, textual canons, non-textual learning practices, worldviews, or the kinds of 
valuationally-configured tasks or problematics that gather and organize philosophical ideas. In the end, it 
may be discovered that certain traditions are not as disparate as initially conceived, and on the other end 
of the spectrum, one might conclude that certain traditions are so alien to each other as to be 
incommensurable. 2  Also, assuming commensurability, comparative philosophy’s minimal aim of 
conceptual bridgework is typically folded within a deeper aim, like finding framings or solutions to 
problems in one’s originary tradition (e.g. is there a Buddhist solution to Western puzzles about 
essentialism?). Moreover, in commending its value as a type of philosophy, much of comparative 
philosophy tends to highlight the insights afforded by moderate to strong cultural or civilizational alterity, 
which is taken to be expressed in another people’s language, culture, canons, and the like. We often see 
this emphasis on alterity and insight in East-West philosophical comparison.3 Arguably, comparative 
philosophy’s value can also be seen in insights derived from political-structural differences in the way of 
life of peoples. This sort of focus characterizes a good portion of Western-Latin American philosophical 
comparison, where there is a pattern of discourse that references profoundly impactful colonial, racial, 
and gendered hierarchies in the lifeworlds and therefrom the philosophies of those who are differentially 
positioned in the relations of domination.4  
There is surely more that can be said about comparative philosophy’s nature and the patterns of 
its practice, but the foregoing seems to touch upon many of its basic features and includes a very wide 
range of comparative philosophical projects. The question of congenial epistemologies for comparative 
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philosophy seems to arise out of concerns not only about the conceptual challenges of this type of 
philosophy but also deep conditioning structures of philosophical practice and the institutions of 
philosophy in the Western world. The issue here is that comparative philosophy strives at a minimum to 
bridge prima facie disparate traditions of knowledge, but the gap between traditions, even when they are 
not incommensurable, may pose significant problems of epistemic access and interpretive accuracy. In 
addition, and more fundamentally, the cultural gap between traditions and distorted understandings of 
alternative bodies of thought may lead one to suppose that an apparently distant tradition does not even 
qualify as a bearer of knowledge (or of enough significant knowledge) and thus even qualify as a body of 
thought worth investigating in the first place. So, it is an important task to figure out which epistemic 
perspectives aid us in the border-crossing knowledge-expanding venture of comparative philosophy. 
Jenco’s essay concisely maps four positions on this issue—the esoteric, the (Enlightenment) universalist, 
the culturally embedded, and the (Chinese) self-transformative—and she advocates the last of these. She 
explains them in this order, but I will discuss them in a different sequence.  
The universalist outlook, as articulated in the European Enlightenment, can be taken as a basic 
and beginning foil for the discussion. Famously, this outlook contends that knowledge is objective, 
unitary, in principle had by any thinker, and manifested, but not anchored, in culture. Think, for example, 
of naturalistic accounts of the metaphysics of the world and the Kantian account of ethical norms. 
Comparative philosophy, then, turns out to be a study of different local or cultural manifestations of an 
underlying, standpoint-independent, unitary body of knowledge.5 One major, by now classic, concern 
raised is that the alleged universalism is actually a highly particular, local, or standpoint-dependent 
viewpoint that is masquerading as universal. The globally dominant form of this particularist subterfuge is 
Eurocentric “universalism.” Jenco joins Dipesh Chakrabarty and other postcolonial thinkers in the 
broadly construed project of “provincializing Europe.” But another important concern is that 
Enlightenment universalism radically diminishes the enterprise of comparative philosophy. It turns 
comparative philosophy into a study of mere manifestations of knowledge rather than an investigation 
into the deep and varied sources of it and the conceptual bridges needed to traverse the gaps between 
these sources, which include on Jenco’s account extra-textual engagements. Jenco rejects universalism 
and moves quickly past this familiar material. 
What Jenco calls “the culturally embedded” account is typically brought into the discussion as a 
contrast to Enlightenment universalism. Drawing from 19th and 20th century European traditions and 
championed more recently by such figures as Charles Taylor and Fred Dallmayr, the account regards 
knowledge to be fundamentally based in the complex set of meanings generated by historically contingent 
social matrices—in a word, culture. Correlatively, these systems of knowledge should be evaluated 
according to criteria that are internal to their local habitats of meanings, highlighting immanent critique 
over transcultural evaluation. As Jenco notes, the culturally embedded account is often coupled with a 
recommendation of a dialogical approach to doing comparative philosophy. Although she largely accepts 
the cultural embeddedness thesis (so long as it does not assert cultural incommensurability), she has 
serious reservations about the dialogical approach, which I will discuss later. For now, suffice it to say 
that the culturally embedded account on her treatment becomes a culturalist-dialogical perspective and 
that she rejects this expanded perspective primarily because it unwittingly becomes self-reflexive and 
intra-tradition-oriented rather than encouraging the expansive and boundary-crossing potential of 
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comparative philosophy. 
Importantly, she discusses two further models that are rarely considered in mainstream 
Anglophone philosophy. The third approach, the esoteric, makes membership in an epistemic community 
a condition of knowledge. Conditions of membership may include a variety of kinds of social positions, 
from highly sedimented ones, like caste, to relatively more agentively determined ones, like the 
achievement of a high level of moral self-cultivation. There may be disputes within the community about 
what the community itself is about and what an outsider must do to gain entry (insofar as entry is deemed 
acceptable by the community). The important point here is that the epistemic outsider must defer to the 
authority of the epistemic community into which he or she seeks admittance. Since the esoteric approach 
tends to centralize gaps, hurdles, or closure rather than movement or boundary crossing, which should be 
accommodated by a general account of comparative philosophy, it is considered only briefly before being 
set aside. But its emphasis on epistemic deference is positively acknowledged by Jenco. 
The final and favored approach is what she calls “the self-transformative.” Drawing from 19th 
and 20th century Chinese thinkers, Jenco contends there is an epistemic approach in which one submits 
oneself to a regimen of self-transformation, including substantial non-textual or non-intellectualistic 
rituals, in order to be properly receptive in both ethical and hermeneutical ways to the ideas of another 
tradition. For example, in previous work, she has elaborated on how the Ming dynasty neo-Confucian 
scholar Wang Yangming advocated a practice in which the six Classics of early China are treated not 
merely as repositories of knowledge but as modes of engagement, existential ones we might even say, by 
which transformative exploration and cultivation of the heartmind (xin) can transpire with positive 
hermeneutic effects later down the road. By commending a regimen of ethical affiliation, textual 
memorization, and meditation, he followed and embellished upon the insights of his predecessor Lu 
Jiuyuan, who famously claimed that “I do not annotate the Classics; the Classics annotate me.” 6 Jenco 
has also discussed in earlier work how the late 19th century thinker Kang Youwei also highlighted 
extra-textual elements in the work of ethical affiliation and cultivation in his New Text philological 
studies of the Classics.7 With these paradigms in mind, she presents a perspective that highlights not only 
“different forms of knowledge” but also a “different identity as ‘knowers’” (Jenco 2017a). The new 
identity may be not only a transformed mind or self in some deep sense, but also induction into a 
community to whose ethico-epistemic way of life one has deferred. In sum, Jenco’s favored outlook, the 
self-transformation model, rejects universalism, is consistent with the cultural embeddedness thesis, 
rejects the self-reflexive nature of the dialogical approach, and envisions a more open and 
movement-conducive perspective than what is offered by the esoteric.  
My main concern with this intriguing discussion of congenial epistemologies is that in offering an 
insightful critique of the culturalist-dialogical model, Jenco has overstated its problems and thus needs to 
reformulate the implications these problems present for comparative philosophy. She largely endorses the 
culturalist perspective, but she advances two main criticisms against the dialogical approach that tends to 
accompany the culturally embedded model. First, in a criticism of James Tully’s work, she contends that 
the dialogical approach assumes that the knowledge gained from cross-cultural dialogue involves either 1) 
prior but tacitly shared knowledge that open discussion renders explicit and articulate or 2) an emergent 
shared knowledge, a “fusion of horizons,” that is constituted in the course of open discussion. Although 
either may indeed be a gain in knowledge, on her view, the bar is set too low: neither squarely commits to 
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a kind of vulnerability before the claims of significantly alternative knowledge and thus both exemplify an 
epistemic conservatism in which there is relatively little movement from the knower’s originary tradition. 
We might add that this is particularly problematic when the institutional infrastructure of the Western 
academy is largely Eurocentric, raising the live skeptical worry that one might not even know that one has 
been weakly positioned in gaining substantial access to alternative knowledge and perhaps even 
conversion to it. As she puts it, the dialogical approach “ultimately enhances our self-reflexivity through 
the elucidation of similarities and differences of our way of life with that of others; by definition it does 
not enable us to understand or be transformed by the knowledge known by the other” (Jenco 2017a). 
Second, the dialogical approach seems to be predicated upon a strong dichotomy between an “us” and 
“them,” which ironically contrasts with the unifying ambitions for which this account is modeled on 
inclusive dialogue.  
Very quickly, regarding her second criticism, it is unclear to me that the dialogical approach in 
general, as opposed to certain instances of it, necessarily and problematically dichotomizes people into 
“us” and “them” or self and “Other.” As I understand this position, the underscoring of a distinction 
between self and other is part of a generic phenomenological conceptual machinery and is not intended 
to imply alienated social relations. In fact, phenomenology, which is strongly linked to the hermeneutic 
tradition (think Gadamer) appealed to by dialogical theorists like Fred Dallmayr, emphasizes 
intersubjectivity or social connection as a defining feature of the self.8 But, certainly, phenomenological 
and hermeneutical concepts—like self, other, alterity, and horizon—can be used distortedly—say, in an 
Orientalist fashion—with alienating consequences. Therefore, insofar as a dialogical account emphasizes 
distance between self and other, we might think of it as expressing its aspirations, namely its having the 
theoretical flexibility to accommodate strong cultural or civilizational alterity rather than asserting a 
necessary estrangement between people. 
Switching to her first critique, I think Jenco offers a subtle and valuable point about the dialogical 
model: dialogue and collaboration are actually compatible with minimal movement across philosophical 
borders, and problematic epistemic stasis may be the hidden norm when there is a kind of gravitational 
pull toward a Western center. And more generally, I appreciate her strong emphasis on epistemic 
deference and the importance of non-rationalistic ritual endeavor as a methodology for comparative 
philosophy. It has been helpful for me to think about these insights as a unity. However, I do think 
dialogical inquiry plays a more significant role in the self-transformation model than she acknowledges. 
I recognize that her account accommodates dialogue. After all, once the self-transformation 
project has begun, there will always be complex textual-conceptual challenges for which an inquiry 
modeled after open dialogue can be helpful. For example, there are debates about how qi, roughly 
speaking the psychophysical matter that composes the world, is transformed in a subject’s heartmind (xin) 
and embodied nature, and these are difficult hermeneutical and conceptual matters.9 A conversation 
between Confucian, phenomenological, and scientific theories could be illuminating for specialists in each 
of these areas.  
However, a looming question in Jenco’s discussion that goes unaddressed is how and why a 
subject initiates a commitment to self-transformation. Even if one does not have a full sense of the 
tradition one is committing to, doesn’t one need for an informed decision at least a basic sense of the 
potentially disparate tradition one is about to defer to and be transformed by? And to gain a basic 
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understanding would seem to require comparative thinking, and such thinking modeled on open 
receptive dialogue seems valuable even if it is not the whole of such thinking. To be clear, Jenco’s 
accommodation of dialogue after self-transformation has begun is not in question. The issue here is that 
we seem to need the dialogical approach in the very formation of self-transformative commitment. For 
example, the formation of self-transformative commitment to Confucianism, perhaps in the vein of 
Wang Yangming, would require of the American person without an East Asian or Confucian upbringing 
a newly learned sense of the relationally-composed person in Confucianism and the kinds of virtues—like 
ren (humaneness), li (ritual propriety), yi (righteousness), and zhi (wisdom)—that normatively configure 
the project of ethical self-transformation, and these notions could be dialogically compared and 
contrasted with, say, Aristotelian or Christian analogues. Such a preliminary project would go a long way 
in facilitating an informed initiation of Wang-style self-transformation. I should add that it is useful to 
recall that both Wang and Kang, in recommending their respective views, were not speaking to outsiders 
but to people already familiar with Confucian traditions. So, they could minimize discussion of 
cross-cultural dialogue and focus primarily on non-rationalistic ritual endeavors. The case at hand, 
however, requires preliminary bridgework that cannot be taken for granted and that dialogical inquiry 
partially supplies.  
But what about Jenco’s first critique of the dialogical model? Again, she claims that in the 
dialogical model one does not truly traverse a bridge to another tradition, being vulnerable, as it were, to 
the guidance of another; rather, one engages in a cooperative endeavor in which one deepens one’s 
position in one’s already accepted tradition. Put another way, open, cooperative, and meaningful dialogue 
is compatible with insufficient dislocation from one’s starting point. 
I would like to suggest that her critique can be recast this way: there is a problematic species of 
the dialogical model that she has identified, one that arises more frequently and certainly more subtly than 
one might expect, but the model itself may be sound, and sound in the more limited conceptual role it 
can legitimately play. And if my earlier remarks about commitment formation are correct, it may be 
necessary that we have something like this model at the beginning because it gives enough understanding of 
the other tradition and of one’s limits in understanding it such that one can meaningfully embark on the 
self-transformation project. Interestingly, she herself gets at this point at the end of her essay when she 
talks about how the self-transformation model doesn’t indicate “what forms of knowledge we should 
pursue or on what basis we should transform ourselves” (Jenco 2017a). I am suggesting that the dialogical 
model can and should, at least in part.  
A related point, which cannot be developed in this short reply, is that we would need this 
preliminary (and subsequent) dialogical inquiry and the resulting initial understanding of the alternative 
tradition in order to determine if non-textual ritual methods are even necessary. I take it that Jenco is not 
saying that every alternative tradition requires the self-transformation process. And if it is determined that 
self-transformation is required or at least methodologically helpful, then one can further use dialogical 
inquiry to explore the extent of the self-transformation one is willing to undergo and the initial 
“existential” openness one has to potentially controversial claims in the alternative tradition. For example, 
a feminist who knows early on in this exploratory process that Confucianism has been strongly 
configured by patriarchy can use dialogical inquiry to determine whether and how the commitment to 
self-transformation should proceed.  
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I think the upshot of the foregoing is that we ought to reconfigure the four-fold differentiating 
taxonomy so that the relevant material is organized in such a way that that the cultural embeddedness 
thesis is united with an inclusive pluralistic methodology, or a harmonized set of methodologies, that can 
be likened to a tool kit, where different combinations of tools are used as appropriate for a given 
alternative tradition. Among these tools would be a modified dialogical approach (in light of Jenco’s 
critique) and a self-transformative approach that emphasizes epistemic deference and non-textual 
ritualization (in light of Jenco’s constructive account). Clearly, I am indebted to Jenco for her insights. 
But, as noted above, I think dialogical inquiry, though but a single tool, has a wider role to play than 
self-transformation and is necessary for self-transformation.  
Importantly, we might add further elements to the multifactorial methodology. For example, 
following to some extent Farah Godrej’s recommendation, comparative philosophy can benefit in many, 
even if not all, cases from an “existential immersion” in the lifeworld of the culture whose tradition one 
seeks to understand.10 This verstehen-focused project may be enhanced by (though on her account may 
require) not just language studies but physical relocation to the relevant culture. Even if one does not 
think verstehen is necessary for determining the veridicality of a set of claims from an alternative tradition, I 
think most would agree that it offers other epistemic goods, like deeper understanding, which in turn can 
produce knowledge of new truths. 11  Another element for the pluralistic methodology would be 
decolonial critique.12 By uniting anti-Eurocentrism and political economy in its particular way, this 
approach reveals the actual world historical and global epistemic context—this critique calls it 
“coloniality”—in which comparative philosophy transpires and has been unfairly marginalized by the 
mainstream of the philosophical profession. It also has potentially unsettling effects upon something 
comparative philosophers might ignore, namely a safe understanding of one’s own originary tradition as 
being only epistemically limited but not morally or politically hegemonic. Sometimes, it is easier to call a 
philosopher to a distant shore with the lure of greater knowledge than have that philosopher radically 
rethink and rectify the home that has been left. Conceivably, there are other elements to be included in a 
pluralistic methodology for comparative philosophy. 
 
                                                
*  I would like to thank Monika Kirloskar-Steinbach and Amy Donahue for their wonderfully insightful 
comments. 
1 See her earlier essay, (Jenco 2007), and, more recently (Jenco 2015). 
2 Alisdair MacIntyre, of course, famously contended that there are incommensurable frameworks within the 
Western history of ethics discourse. His work highlights complexity in what would count as 
incommensurability, an issue that does not need to be resolved for the discussion at hand. 
3 David Hall and Roger Ames, for example, make a point of this. See (Hall, and Ames 1995: chap. 2). 
4 Enrique Dussel, for example, characterizes the lifeworld and philosophical work of Latin Americans as 
being so deeply excluded from Western philosophical dialogue that Latin American philosophy must enter 
the mainstream philosophical forum from a radically exterior point of entry, making such connective work 
not so much dialectical as analectical. See his (2008). Also, a roughly similar type of concern can be seen in 
Charles Mills’s discussion of Africana and Afro-modern traditions in (Mills 2015). There is no space to 
discuss the matter, but I see comparative philosophy as large enough to include both the alterity-focused 
work of East-West comparison and the analectical work that is common in, though not the whole of, Latin 
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American-Western and Africana-Western comparison. 
5 Here we are working with general approaches. I do think, however, that in another context it would be 
worthwhile to consider more moderate and thus plausible variants of this position. One might involve the 
restriction of the universalism to certain domains of knowledge (e.g. metaphysics) but not others (e.g. 
ethics). This would be a domain-specific universalism. Another, perhaps a chastened universalism, might 
contend that though all knowledge (or significant domains of it) is unitary and independent of culture, it 
must be accessed through cultural forms in such a way that there is a genuine need for a deep kind of 
comparative philosophy. The idea here is that even if knowledge is manifested in culture, there is nothing 
“mere” about such manifestation, requiring knowledge to be derived from many cultural sources and thus 
implying the rejection of Eurocentrism or any form of privileged center. Of course, these two kinds can be 
combined. In fact, the distance between a chastened universalism and what Jenco calls “the culturally 
embedded” view may be very small. For reflections conveying these sorts of ideas in Indian traditions, see 
Ganeri (2011). Thanks go to Amy Donahue for this suggestion. For relevant application to Chinese 
traditions, see Wong (2006). 
6 For more on this, see Jenco (2007: 747). Also see Kalmanson (2017): 399–418. 
7 Jenco (2007: 750). 
8 See, for example, Zahavi (2005). 
9 See, for example, Csikszentmihalyi (2004). 
10 See Godrej (2011).  
11 Jenco mentions Godrej’s account while discussing the esoteric approach and seems to be critical of 
Godrej’s account. What I offer here is a different way to think about Godrej’s contributions. 
12 For some work on decolonial comparative thought that has a partial or strong link to Asian philosophies, 
see: Donahue, and Kalyan (2015); Kalmanson (2015); Kim (2015) and Kim (forthcoming).  
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The Assumptions of Cross-Cultural Philosophy: What Makes It Possible to Learn 
from Other Traditions  
 
THADDEUS METZ 
University of Johannesburg (tmetz@uj.ac.za) 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In “Global Knowledge Frameworks and the Tasks of Cross-Cultural Philosophy,” I read Leigh Jenco as 
seeking to answer the question of what knowledge must be like in order for cross-cultural philosophy to 
make sense. More carefully, she considers how we probably have to construe knowledge in order for it to 
be apt for us to adopt the attitude that philosophical frameworks other than our own have something of 
value for us. In search of which conception of knowledge would best justify the judgment that non-local 
ways of interpreting the world have something to contribute, Jenco considers four possibilities, and 
argues that one is to be favored over the other three. These options are, in catchwords, the esoteric, 
Enlightenment, hermeneutic, and self-transformative conceptions of knowledge, with Jenco defending 
the latter as more plausible than the former three.  
Jenco’s article is a welcome reminder to the field that it is not enough merely to include 
non-Western views in largely Western anthologies and curricula, but to take them seriously as giving 
Western philosophers and related thinkers reason to reconsider their ways of interpreting the world.1 
Given that this fallibilist attitude is appropriate, it is well worth addressing what would make the best 
sense of it, as Jenco does. Furthermore, I appreciate the big picture that she has provided by way of doing 
so; despite the routine demand from many post-colonial and post-modern thinkers to focus on 
particularity and context, I believe there is still an essential role for broad, bird’s-eye philosophy. Jenco’s 
four-fold division of conceptions of knowledge from around the world is a revealing and useful way to 
organize reflection on what the proper aims of cross-cultural philosophy are and what pursuing them 
involves. Her self-transformative approach to knowledge is worth taking seriously, and her criticisms of 
rival approaches are prima facie compelling.  
In this critical discussion of Jenco’s article, I consider whether there is a fifth conception of 
knowledge that might underwrite cross-cultural philosophy of the sort we both endorse, using my own 
engagements as a springboard. As someone who was initially trained in the Continental and 
Anglo-American philosophical traditions but who has spent more than a decade learning African 
philosophy and putting it into critical comparison with East Asian and Western thought,2 I have read 
Jenco’s piece with an eye toward self-understanding. Which conception of knowledge has guided my own 
enquiry, specifically as someone who has indeed approached African philosophy with the attitude of 
expecting to discover some new truths from it? I find that my own assumptions are not well captured by 
any of Jenco’s four options, and so in this article am led to sketch an alternative, pluralist account of 
knowledge, one that I advance as explaining well what “makes it possible to acknowledge the value, and 
not only mere existence, of foreign bodies of thought” (Jenco 2017a). 
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I begin by briefly recounting Jenco’s four-fold division of conceptions of knowledge and their 
purported advantages and disadvantages (section 2). After making some objections that appear to apply 
to her account, I bring out how a pluralist account of knowledge appears to have been guiding me in my 
enquiries and how it might serve as a plausible fifth option (section 3). I then consider whether my 
purported alternative is reducible to a form of Jenco’s rejected Enlightenment conception, and argue that 
it is not (while also suggesting, that, if it is, then the Enlightenment view is in fact defensible when it takes 
a pluralist form) (section 4). I conclude by reminding the reader that the debate between Jenco and myself 
has focused strictly on cross-cultural philosophy in search of knowledge, but that it is worth noting that 
cross-cultural philosophy can make good sense as a way to obtain other epistemic goods even when 
knowledge is not forthcoming (section 5). 
 
 
2 Jenco’s Self-Transformative Conception of Knowledge 
 
Jenco articulates four “ideal types” (as per Max Weber) of knowledge and associates them with certain 
views that have been salient in different parts of the world at various times. In this section I summarize 
Jenco’s characterizations of them and of their respective strengths and weaknesses, which will set the 
stage for me to advance a fifth alternative.  
One major approach to knowledge is “esoteric,” in the sense of “traditions that limit the scope 
of who may have knowledge of what,” specifically to members of in-groups who have “special 
qualification or standing—such as their caste, social status, level of moral cultivation” (Jenco 2017a).. 
Often the thought is that only those who have been initiated into a certain way of life are epistemically 
able to grasp the knowledge, while sometimes the idea is that, even if outsiders could in principle 
apprehend it, they should for practical reasons be excluded from doing so. As Jenco sensibly points out, 
doing cross-cultural philosophy in search of knowledge makes little or no sense if knowledge is esoteric. 
If those from, say, the West are epistemically or practically incapable of grasping knowledge from a 
non-Western culture, then there is no way that a cross-cultural philosophy can be done in which 
Westerners can learn something from the other tradition. Of course, one might be able to become a 
member of the in-group, but Jenco is aptly interested in how an outsider such as a professional academic 
philosopher could engage in cross-cultural philosophy.  
The same problem affects the “hermeneutic” approach to knowledge, according to which 
knowledge is restricted not to a “small coterie of suitably qualified individuals” (Jenco 2017a) as the per 
the esoteric approach, but rather to those in “background conditions which give rise to embedded 
knowledge” (Jenco 2017a). The idea is that knowledge-claims are true, warranted, or even intelligible 
relative only to a certain culture, so that if one is not a member of this culture, one cannot apprehend the 
knowledge in it. Ultimately, this is a form of epistemic relativism, which entails that, while there might be 
differences between claims to knowledge throughout the world, there are in fact no disagreements between 
them: either interlocutors cannot understand each other enough to disagree, or truth/warrant obtains 
only in relation to beliefs that are part of a certain contextual web and are not ascribing competing 
properties to a mind-independent, common subject matter. Relativism entails that what is true-for-me 
cannot be true-for-you, insofar as your cultural background differs from mine. Again, a cross-cultural 
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philosophy, at least one in search of knowledge from a foreign tradition, gains no traction with this 
conception of knowledge. 
A third understanding of knowledge is the “Enlightenment” view of “knowledge as singular, 
unified and uniquely true” (Jenco 2017a). According to this view, knowledge claims, or at least 
philosophical ones, are often universally true as opposed to true relative to certain societies, and they are 
in principle accessible to anyone, whatever one’s cultural background. The idea is that there is a single 
form of reason available to everyone (who has the relevant epistemic faculties) that can reveal truths that 
apply to everyone. On the face of it, this conception of knowledge appears easily to avoid the problem 
facing the esoteric and hermeneutic accounts. However, Jenco says that a bit of reflection shows 
otherwise: 
 
In this framework, the various forms of knowledge […] in which what we know is mediated and 
constituted by a huge range of social, religious, and political authorities, or which is derived from 
faith or revelation, would not qualify as knowledge worthy of the name. On this framework, or 
indeed any framework which claims its knowledge as singular, unified and uniquely true, 
provincialization is by definition impossible (Jenco 2017a). 
 
By “provincialization” Jenco means an approach to knowledge that views itself as “one possibility among 
rival alternatives, rather than as the only form of true knowledge” (Jenco 2017a). Her suggestion is that 
since the Enlightenment approach implies that there is a single kind of rational enquiry, it cannot be open 
to discovering other forms that merit the dignity of the title of “knowledge.” 
Finally, Jenco sketches a fourth understanding of knowledge, the only one, it appears, that can 
make sense of a cross-cultural philosophy seeking to learn from a radically different intellectual history. 
According to her “self-transformative” conception, those from a given culture can learn from another 
one insofar as they change their own culture to become more like the one from which they want to learn. 
Jenco gives the example of Chinese intellectuals who thought they could understand Western knowledge 
“through replication and participation in those ‘Western’ forms of life that supported such knowledge 
and made it meaningful” (Jenco 2017a). Roughly, the idea is that in order to appreciate Western 
knowledge claims, the Chinese had to become (more) Western. According to Jenco, this 
self-transformative conception “views knowledge as socially embedded, yet capable of circulating beyond 
its original contexts of production; it sets conditions upon the acquisition of knowledge, yet sees those 
conditions as malleable over time and across human efforts” and so it “may be the most congenial to the 
practice of cross cultural philosophy, because it provides a method by which knowledge might be 
transmitted without at the same time claiming that knowledge is unitary” (Jenco 2017a). 
In the following section I provide a fallibilist account of knowledge that I believe rivals Jenco’s 
favored one. Before doing so, however, I provide some reasons to doubt hers.  
One concern is whether Jenco’s view adequately avoids the problem facing the esoteric and 
hermeneutic approaches. To be sure, she is not committed to thinking that cross-cultural philosophy is 
impossible. However, she does appear committed to thinking that it is not possible in the absence of 
self-transformation, where few cultures have, or might even be likely to, self-transform in the ways she 
prescribes. Her view does not seem able to account for the intuition that cross-cultural philosophy of a 
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sort that provides instruction can be done now by some philosophers sitting behind our laptops, reading 
books, going to conferences, corresponding with colleagues, and doing the other usual stuff.  
Jenco might suggest that those who are doing cross-cultural philosophy now and learning 
something from it have self-transformed. However, that is unlikely, given that it is supposed to be a 
large-scale, intergenerational endeavor in the first instance. Note Jenco’s key example of how Chinese 
intellectuals “Westernized” themselves, where this “replication of the social practices that produced 
certain kinds of knowledge was not the work of one individual, but rather happened collectively over 
many generations, through the construction of durable institutions, transformation of values over time, 
and alterations in the languages and forms of inquiry” (Jenco 2017a). As the West has not done that in 
respect of China, it follows that Westerners cannot yet learn from cross-cultural philosophy with Chinese 
sources. While I accept that those in the West might well do it better, at least in one respect, if they were 
to “Sinologize,” I submit that they can do it, and indeed have done it,3 to some real degree without their 
broader intellectual culture having Sinologized.  
Another concern about Jenco’s hypothesis is that it cannot account well for the intuition that 
diversity, not sameness, is what really fosters knowledge. It is unfair to suggest that, for Jenco, we all must 
become the same in order to understand each other. Yet it seems fair to say that we all must become 
more like each other in order to do so. However, it is commonly held that creativity and insight are often 
a function of putting two very different perspectives together. Part of the present objection is that, if 
thinkers around the globe took Jenco’s advice, then there would be less diversity among them and hence 
fewer discoveries by them. However, the deeper part is that cross-cultural discoveries are already being 
made in the apparent absence of homogenization.  
For just one example, salient Western thought about the nature of democracy has plausibly been 
upended by consideration of consensus-oriented decision-making practices salient among a wide array of 
traditional sub-Saharan peoples. Contemporary Westerners tend to conceive democracy as a 
Euro-American invention that is essentially majoritarian and competitive, with it consisting of political 
parties that jockey for the most votes and then rule in ways expected to benefit their constituencies. 
However, as African thinkers from a variety of peoples have shown, pre-colonial politics in sub-Saharan 
Africa was intuitively democratic but did not allow for majority rule. For instance, sometimes a king 
would enact what was unanimously recommended by a group of (usually male) elders who had been 
popularly appointed and who sought to resolve conflicts in a way that was to the benefit of everyone. 
Other times, a king would have all those affected by a dispute talk under the proverbial tree until they 
found a way forward that all could accept. In the light of these kinds of practices, contemporary African 
political philosophers have proposed a “non-party polity”4 in which Parliamentarians would advance 
policies that they think are good for the public as a whole and would adopt only those that are the object 
of unanimous agreement among themselves.  
 
 
3 A Pluralist Conception of Knowledge 
 
In this section I suggest another way to construe knowledge that would make possible a cross-cultural 
philosophical engagement in which one seeks to learn from those working in different traditions. I start 
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by reflecting briefly on some of my own experience, and then draw out of that a pluralist account of 
knowledge that I have been presuming and that is distinct from Jenco’s four categories.  
I like to think that I have learned something substantial about African philosophy since I 
relocated from the United States to South Africa in 2004. If I have not, then someone owes me an 
explanation of what I am doing in those published works of mine in that field. To be sure, it could be 
that I am doing more Western (and specifically Anglo-American) philosophy than African philosophy 
and have hoodwinked dozens of African editors. There are indeed a handful of African nationalists who 
contend something like that, and I will not take offense if Jenco suggests it! However, for now, let me run 
with the claim that I have come to understand much of the African philosophical tradition. 
Furthermore, let me suppose that I have not merely understood some African philosophy, but 
have also learned important things from it, particularly concerning relationality in ethics and metaphysics. 
For example, I now think that relational properties, concerning the capacity for a certain type of 
communion, are essential to grasp the moral status of a being, not intrinsic properties such as pleasure or 
autonomy, and further that right action is also at bottom a function of responding to relationality in the 
right way.5 I still remember the shift in my head when I heard an elderly African woman say that for her 
the biggest problem with being poor is that she has nothing to give away, a view I cannot recall having 
encountered living in the US. 
I have also come to doubt my previously unquestioned acceptance of the view that the essence 
of a thing, whether it be the nature of the self or of water, is determined merely by intrinsic properties, 
such as a chain of mental states or a chemical composition, respectively. I am now open to the idea that it 
is constituted at least in large part by its relationships to other things, if not to a whole.6  
I am pretty sure that I would not have come to take these views seriously if I had not immersed 
myself in African philosophy (or in Chinese philosophy, which, I have also come to learn, shares many 
features with it7). So, I believe I have been doing cross-cultural philosophy and with the sort of attitude 
that Jenco recommends, of seeking something valuable–indeed full-blown knowledge–from a different 
tradition.  
However, I have not been initiated into a sub-Saharan people or in any other sense become an 
African—people still see me as a foreign white guy. I also have not been part of an on-going 
self-transformative intellectual culture in the West that has been trying to become more African in the 
way it experiences and interprets the world. There is no such project. Finally, I also have not subscribed, 
at least not intentionally or knowingly, to an Enlightenment conception of knowledge of the sort Jenco 
(2017a) articulates according to which “knowledge is unitary.” On the face of it, I have instead grappled 
with real disparity when it comes to knowledge in an African context. As above, with respect to ethical 
content, I have changed my mind in believing now that an individual’s extrinsic and not intrinsic 
properties are fundamental to morality. With respect to metaphysical understanding, I now am tempted 
to think that one cannot know a thing in isolation but must grasp its relations. Still more, with respect to 
materials, I have had to deal with the fact that the African philosophical tradition has mainly been an oral 
one, with not even three generations of sub-Saharan philosophers writing in journals and books having 
gone by, which has meant, for example, needing to grapple with the meanings of proverbs and stories. 
With respect to sources of knowledge, I have expanded my horizons to consider emotion to be one 
alongside perception, memory, testimony, and reason, such that, perhaps, the “African world of art is as 
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fully knowing in its own right as the world of science” (Anyanwu 1987: 259).  
Supposing my self-description is not wildly off the mark, which conception of knowledge 
underwrites it? What must knowledge be like for me to have been able to learn from the African 
tradition?  
For me to have approached African philosophers with the attitude of learning from them implies 
that I must have been open to thinking that Western philosophers, from whom I had been trained, were 
not entirely correct and were epistemically mistaken in some respects. Now, for mistake to be possible, it 
must be the case there are mind-independent truths (or at least justified beliefs), ones that obtain not 
merely in virtue of the content of a particular society’s propositional attitudes. That is, it must be the case 
that relativism is false, as Jenco has pointed out in respect of the hermeneutic approach to knowledge. 
For mistake to be probable, it must be the case that there was evidence that the African tradition has had 
some insight into these objective truths that the Western one has by and large lacked. In sum, 
cross-cultural philosophy with the aim of learning from a foreign body of thought makes good sense if 
there are objective truths to which no one culture has a monopoly.  
That claim is part of what I take to be the most powerful argument for multiculturalism: any 
long-standing epistemic tradition probably has some insight into the ways things truly are. The real 
argument for multiculturalism is epistemic; moral-pragmatic considerations of showing respect, being 
tolerant, avoiding arrogance, imparting self-esteem, and the like are extras.  
To illustrate this view of knowledge in the context of moral values, consider the way Allen Wood 
has characterized the epistemic status of a given globally-situated ethical philosophy:  
 
[S]ince we cannot coherently act or reason at all about what to do or think without presupposing 
that there are objectively good reasons, we should not abandon that presupposition. But since the 
fact of cross-cultural disagreement gives us good grounds for doubting the accepted or traditional 
ethical beliefs and attitudes of our own culture, we should allow ourselves to question whether 
these beliefs and attitudes are correct, and we should accept […] that we will never be entitled to 
think that these beliefs and attitudes are infallible […] Accordingly, the most natural assumption 
about any culture's ethical beliefs and attitudes—those of our own and other cultures—is that they 
may contain part of the objective truth […] Different cultures have widely different conditions of 
life and historical backgrounds in apprehending these truths, so the awareness of any culture 
regarding this will be fallible and probably partial or skewed in certain ways (Wood 2007: 338, 339). 
 
What Wood says of moral values strikes me as plausible in respect of philosophical knowledge more 
generally. I presume this pluralist account of who in the world has philosophical knowledge contrasts 
with Jenco’s and others’ characterization of the Enlightenment as monist, i.e., as presuming that Western 
scientific culture alone has access to knowledge or is “singular, unified and uniquely true.” 
It does not follow that all philosophers should engage in cross-cultural philosophy. There could 
be excellent practical reason for some to specialize, to stay burrowed in their intellectual homes with their 
familiar conceptual furnishings, and for others to leave in search of something unfamiliar. The point is 
that doing the latter with the aim of acquiring new knowledge makes good sense on the supposition that 
many cultures have some insight into objective philosophical truths and that a decent chunk of that 
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insight does not get lost in various kinds of translation. 
It is surely the case that one would better understand another culture’s insight into philosophical 
truths if one knew its language, were not aspect-blind to its ways of perceiving the world-as-something (cf. 
the late Wittgenstein), could readily deploy its conceptual apparatus, and all the rest that would be 
particularly facilitated by collective self-transformation of the sort Jenco recommends. A key question is 
whether doing so is necessary in order to learn something substantial from another culture. I submit not, 
or else I would not have been able to change my mind so much upon having engaged with the African 
philosophical tradition.  
 
 
4 Is Pluralism an Enlightenment Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing? 
 
Jenco may contend at this point that I have not in fact changed my mind all that much. I need to engage 
with her powerful point that even if Enlightenment advocates are open to discovering new knowledge 
when it comes to content, they are not when it comes to form. They are “criticized for placing constraints, 
not on who may have capacities to obtain such knowledge, but on what counts as knowledge itself” 
(Jenco 2017a), excluding, recall, appeals to faith and revelation. Is the pluralist conception of knowledge 
vulnerable to this charge?  
Looking at the sort of putatively African moral philosophy I myself have advanced, a theory 
grounded on the value of communion, it appears so.8 It reeks of the search for something comparable to 
scientific law in the realm of the moral. It relies heavily on argumentation, and especially analogy and 
inference to the best explanation. It does not appeal to faith, revelation, or, it should be added in the 
African context, the paranormal or divination of what a people’s ancestors prescribe for it. Its key 
elements are secular, including no essential reference to any imperceptible agents such as ancestors and 
God.  
However, it is not merely relational content, as it were, that I take myself to have learned from 
African philosophers. For example, I now do believe that emotion can be a source of moral knowledge 
akin to the usual suspects of perception, testimony, and so on. In addition, I am now strongly inclined to 
think that the best, or at least an important, way to know the nature of something is to consider its 
relational properties. These are substantial departures from the analytic canon, ones that are seemingly 
“formal.” 
More generally, if I am going to be pluralist about not just morality but philosophy generally, 
then it follows that I must be pluralist about epistemology and, specifically, about what counts as 
knowledge. Consistency demands, therefore, that I must treat my own tradition’s conception of 
knowledge as fallible and be open to learning differently from other traditions.  
However, there are limits to this pluralism about the nature of knowledge itself, limits that I am 
willing to “bite the bullet” to accept and that I believe would be hard for others to reject reasonably. One 
limit concerns definitional elements of talk of “knowledge.” When using the word “knowledge” (more 
carefully, “knowledge that”) in our linguistic community, we are analytically talking about a belief that is 
true and has some kind of warrant. If some other community were to use the word “knowledge” without 
this sense attached to it, then it would be speaking about something different from what we are. We 
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would be speaking past one another, so that its different use of the term would neither constitute 
disagreement with us, nor provide any reason for us to change our minds about what counts as 
knowledge. By analogy, if Buddhists started suddenly speaking of “God” as essential to their 
long-standing religion, one would be foolish to approach it with an eye to learning about what the 
monotheist tradition means by the word; for they simply would not have in mind anything about a 
self-aware, spiritual creator of the physical universe.  
A second limit of the pluralism concerns various conceptions of the concept of knowledge, that 
is, different substantive accounts of the three core properties of belief, truth, and warrant. There is much 
debate, both within Western philosophy and between it and other traditions, about what a belief consists 
of, what truth is, and what counts as warrant. A given culture should indeed, by my lights, be pluralist 
about the nature of these elements, and so be open to learning from other cultures about them. However, 
it does not follow that the former will in fact learn from the latter at the end of the day. Contending that 
knowledge about the nature of knowledge is not unique to one culture does not entail that it is distributed 
equally across cultures. Some might have (much) more insight into the nature of knowledge than others, 
in the way that some, for a time, had much more insight into the nature of gravity.  
Interesting questions arise at this point about how to know that one knows about the nature of 
knowledge! Those questions deserve answers. However, answering them is not essential to make the 
points that it is not unreasonable to think that knowledge is unequally distributed among philosophical 
traditions and that it could turn out to be the case that knowledge about the nature of knowledge in 
particular is more heavily concentrated in one of them. If so, some philosophers might well know that 
mere faith is not in fact knowledge since it lacks warrant. They might know that without being certain and 
while acknowledging they could be mistaken.  
Am I back to the Enlightenment view? I do not believe so, for I have not been supposing that 
when doing philosophy I am deploying, or that others should deploy, a “given set of universal principles 
or forms of knowledge already known to the investigator” (Jenco 2017a). Being a pluralist about the form 
of knowledge means being open to debate about the nature of belief, truth, and warrant and hence 
seeking to learn from other long-standing traditions about those matters. It happens also to mean, 
however, that there might be cases in which those other traditions have something substantial to learn 
from one’s own.  
 
 
5 Conclusion: Why Cross-Cultural Philosophy without  
Knowledge Would Still Be Worth Doing 
 
This exchange has been framed by a specific question, namely, whether certain knowledge frameworks 
are more congenial to the aims of cross-cultural philosophy. Jenco and I have therefore focused our 
attention on knowledge, and not other epistemic goods. I conclude by pointing out that this is a fairly 
large restriction, and that if it were loosened up, one would discover substantial epistemic reason to 
engage in cross-cultural philosophy even if knowledge were not forthcoming from doing so. Again, one 
can “acknowledge the value, and not only mere existence, of foreign bodies of thought,” and indeed their 
epistemic value, even if one does not expect to learn true propositions from them because of either 
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relativism, monism, or a “lop-sided” pluralism in which one tradition has a corner on the epistemic 
market (even if not a full-blown monopoly).  
For a key example of an epistemic good that does not consist of knowledge, consider imagining 
the world to be a certain way. As Ward Jones, an epistemologist, has said, “Imagining a theory to be true 
is a matter of ‘trying it on,’ of temporarily taking the world to be as the theory describes it to be” (Jones 
2011: 134). Thinking in a new, coherent way and considering plausible hypotheses that one had not 
before are good candidates for intellectual virtue. And even if one denies that they are good for their own 
sake, they are at the very least good as a means for broadening one’s cognitive horizons, and so can 
provide strong reason to engage with cultures different from one’s own. There are plausibly additional 
epistemic but non-doxastic reasons to engage in cross-cultural philosophy besides one’s imagination 
being exercised in a certain way, but they merit thorough exploration elsewhere. 
 
                                                
  
2 For some recent representative texts, see Metz (2016, 2018b); and Hoffmann, and Metz (2017). 
3 Might some of Jenco’s other work, particularly insofar as it has engaged in Western and Chinese 
comparative philosophy, be a nice example of cross-cultural success? 
4 In the words of Kwasi Wiredu (2000). 
5 E.g., Metz (2012); and Metz, and Clark Miller (2016).  
6 E.g., Metz (unpublished draft). 
7 Metz (2017a). 
8 E.g., Metz (2012, 2018b); and Metz, and Gaie (2010). 
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On Justifying the Non-Adoption of Cross-Cultural Approach to Philosophy* 
 
MILJANA MILOJEVIC 
University of Belgrade, Serbia (miljana.milojevic@f.bg.ac.rs) 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In “Global Knowledge Frameworks and the Task of Cross Cultural Philosophy,” Leigh Jenco (2017a) 
differentiates between four knowledge frameworks—esoteric, enlightenment, embedded, and 
self-transformative—examines them and investigates the possibility and form of cross-cultural 
philosophy given their adoption. She starts with the definition of the aim of cross-cultural philosophy as 
“acknowledg[ing] the value, and not only mere existence, of foreign bodies of thought” (Jenco 2017a) and 
decides that the self-transformative knowledge framework is the most congenial to this aim. The basis 
upon which she builds her argument is the need of “provincialization” of knowledge or the need to 
recognize a particular knowledge “as one possibility among other rival alternatives, rather than as the only 
form of true knowledge” (Jenco 2017a). Jenco further argues that esoteric, enlightenment and embedded 
frameworks suffer from certain shortcomings which prevent the full realization of the goal of 
cross-cultural philosophy. At the end of her paper she offers the self-transformative knowledge 
framework as a corrective.  
In this comment, I want to assume a different starting point. I will start from the current state in 
philosophy as it is taught at Western universities, and from the two facts that seem to be at odds: a) 
philosophy taught at these universities is diverse and pluralistic, b) but it is almost exclusively Western. I 
will then offer a reinterpretation of Jenco’s knowledge frameworks as different conceptualizations of 
knowledge used in attempts to justify the neglect of non-Western traditions. Namely, I will treat the main 
assumptions of these frameworks as different answers to the question “Why are our philosophy syllabi 
almost exclusively Western?” I will conclude that in unjustifiably assuming cognitive constraints in 
understanding writings from other cultures, esoteric, enlightenment, embedded and even 
self-transformative knowledge frameworks widen the gap between cultures and prevent the more 
extensive application of cross-cultural approach. In doing so, I will agree with Jenco’s insight that the first 
three of these frameworks are detrimental to the practice of cross-cultural philosophy, but I will disagree 
with her claim that self-transformation, which should better our understanding of others, is the most 
suitable way for remedying their limitations. Instead I will try to show that obstacles for wider application 
of cross-cultural approach are rather found in the social and historical aspects of philosophical knowledge, 
and not in the cognitive abilities of differently situated subjects.  
 
 
2 Nature of Philosophical Knowledge and the Cultural Divide 
 
Philosophy is as diverse as it is old, and defining its methods, aims, and subject matter is a feat of its own. 
We can find testimony to this claim in the fact that an attempt to provide an account of what philosophy 
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is constitutes a field of study of a separate philosophical subject1, namely, of philosophy of philosophy or 
metaphilosophy. Professional philosophers will often disagree on aims of their profession in general2, and 
they will equally disagree on the current state of affairs of their study field and about the present direction 
of their endeavors.3 Subject matter of particular topics will range from the nature of fundamental 
particles, to the origins of morality; and methods for reaching conclusions about these most abstract 
matters will include reference to coherence of beliefs, intuition, deduction, conceptual analysis, 
transcendental argumentation, thought experiments, etc. Years of training in this discipline will usually 
endow us with the ability to differentiate philosophical writings from other kinds of knowledge, but these 
recognitional capacities would be probably best described as abilities to pick out some family 
resemblances4 or to recognize paradigmatic examples in Kuhn’s (1962) sense. This idiosyncratic feature 
of philosophical knowledge5 is certainly the reason why some philosophers rejected the very idea of a 
philosophy of philosophy6, and a possibility to identify a single method, or aim, of practicing philosophy. 
The differences between empiricists and rationalists, analytic or armchair and experimental philosophers, 
Russell and Sartre, Žižek and Kripke, are too profound to be captured under one shared concept, and a 
single criterion of identification would necessarily leave some of them out. 
The reason for such pluralism of topics, methods and assumed aims, even in one single tradition, 
is at the heart of philosophy. It is a consequence of not conforming to a set of accepted assumptions. 
Philosophers question conventional frameworks of thinking—whether they are found in our everyday 
interaction with the world or in science—reflect on hidden truths about the world, provide alternative 
hypotheses, build theories, or criticize accepted beliefs. The unempirical nature of their hypotheses, which 
precede a systemization of structured scientific knowledge, and a lack of verification procedures make 
their positions widely diverse and regularly opposing. The extensive PhilPapers survey conducted in 2009 
shows this diversity of thinking in philosophical community, where beliefs in opposing alternatives about 
the thirty most important philosophical questions are almost equally distributed7. This is why studying 
philosophy can be seen as a way in itself to transform us as epistemic agents. We learn to recognize 
particular pieces of knowledge “as one possibility among other rival alternatives, rather than as the only 
form of true knowledge” (Jenco 2017a). Exposure to opposing systems of thought with similar or equal 
persuasive power makes us prone to question or suspend our own core beliefs, and practice a certain kind 
of “epoche”8. Thus, recognizing and then transcending biases and social encapsulation, no matter if ever 
fully accomplished, is always a part of a task of doing philosophy which seeks to better understand the 
world independent of our own particular perspective. So, given this, and given that studying teachings 
from other cultures always reveals cultural differences and thus our further biases, why we do not see 
more comparative philosophy done? We gladly compare alternatives coming from different periods and 
from different philosophical systems of the West, for instance Aristotle’s and Hume’s views on causation, 
but rarely look at insights coming from Asian, African or Indian traditions. 
The problem in philosophy is not to “acknowledge the value […] of foreign bodies of thought,” 
but to acknowledge “the mere existence” (Jenco 2017a) of these bodies of knowledge as philosophy. This 
institutionalized cultural blindness can, paradoxically, be seen as a very consequence of the “liberal” 
nature of philosophy just described. Namely, given that philosophical knowledge is so diverse in its 
methods and topics, the main criterion efficiently used to identify something as philosophy is to 
investigate its historical connections to what Westerners refer to as “the cradle of philosophy,” namely, 
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ancient Greek thinkers. This problem of identification can be seen as a problem of the determination of 
reference. Because of the lack of an acknowledged set of descriptions, we implicitly turned to recognizing 
philosophy by its causal connections to the first grounding of the term. This practice is especially 
prominent in organizing study courses at Western universities. While I believe that it is necessary to 
search for these historical connections in identifying philosophy, I also believe that we can talk about 
multiple groundings of philosophy in different cultures, and not only in a single one. 
 
 
3 Justifying the Rift by Assuming Different Knowledge Frameworks 
 
Briefly surveying the history of philosophy teaches us two things: philosophy is diverse and pluralistic, 
and philosophy is deeply traditional. These two insights seem to be in conflict, but are nevertheless tightly 
connected. They correspond to two different dimensions of knowledge: its cognitive aspect which 
reflects on methods and abilities for gaining it, and its social aspect or how it is institutionally organized.  
We began with the idea that there is some sort of family resemblance between philosophical 
teachings, and that this resemblance guides us in recognizing something as philosophy, but it turns out 
that this is not sufficient for such recognition. Philosophy, as other expert forms of knowledge, is 
necessarily institutionalized. It is a discipline with a history of different topics, various solutions to 
recognized problems, and doing philosophy professionally assumes that a practitioner is acquainted with 
different positions and views on the topic he is dealing with. Recognizing a family resemblance with 
philosophical positions in writings outside this practice would not typically be sufficient to grant it a 
full-blown status of being philosophy. Whereas in other disciplines (chemistry, biology, etc.) historical 
references are mainly used as a proof of the scientific progress and accumulation of knowledge within the 
discipline, in philosophy historical references are also used for identifying a text as a piece of philosophy9. 
But why do we have a problem in recognizing teachings of other traditions concerning recognized 
philosophical topics or with the mentioned family resemblance to Western philosophy? Certainly, they 
are not just spurious thoughts about life and existence, or conjectures about ourselves and nature. They 
are also a product of persistent endeavor to comprehend some of the hardest issues concerning ourselves 
and our world, with their own history and course of development. 
There are two post hoc answers that are sometimes provided10 to justify this rift: 1) Western form 
of thinking is the only one suitable for true philosophy, and 2) there are vast cultural differences which 
preclude or at least make difficult cross-cultural understanding. Both of which I find to be false. These 
two answers correspond to Jenco’s identification of enlightenment (and in the most radical form of 
esoteric) and embedded knowledge frameworks. They reflect beliefs that only our way of gaining 
knowledge is proper or that we are socially embedded in one community and outsiders cannot completely 
understand our position. While the first claim assumes that there has to be only one way for gaining 
philosophical knowledge, the second one assumes that social embedding deeply affects our cognitive 
abilities; thus, both focus on ways and possibility of gaining such knowledge. 
As we saw, it is not philosophical practice itself which assumes a sole method or aim of 
philosophy; it is the institutional form of philosophy that implies this by offering almost exclusively 
Western course syllabi. As Anand Jayprakash Vaidya notices all-Western syllabi, for e.g. critical thinking 
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courses, send a message to students that other traditions do not have anything to offer worth studying 
concerning logic or methods of argumentation, and disregard contributions such is Hindu syllogism of 
the Nyāya school11. Justification of such decisions is often rooted in claims that critical thinking, or 
philosophy in general, is based on Western logic, is independent of religion, and possess a special high 
degree of rationality, and that these requests are not met by “philosophical” writings of other cultures. It 
is true that a large portion of Western philosophy shares these traits. They are recognized in cultural 
psychology as one of the cognitive patterns associated with certain societies, namely, analytic cognitive 
patterns prevalent in Western societies, which is in opposition with holistic patterns characteristic of East 
Asian societies12. But these patterns of thinking present only tendencies. Namely, if we assume that the 
analytic pattern is the only correct one we will exclude even recognized parts of Western philosophy 
which are still taught at Western universities. These claims about a universal method can be taken only as 
a kind of an unjustified bias, a remnant of a colonial project13—a bias that we employ when faced with 
different cultures, but not when assessing our own, a bias we should do well to leave behind. 
Nevertheless, perhaps it is not that the requirements are higher for other cultures, but it could be 
that the views on philosophical problems coming from different traditions are such that they can never 
become transparent to foreigners as they are to the members of those cultural groups. An embedded 
framework “presume[s] that forms of knowledge to some extent cannot be shared among participants to 
a dialogue in the same way that (presumably) they can be shared among those who already participate in 
one’s “background forms of life and ways of thought” (Jenco 2017a). Our cognitive abilities are strongly 
influenced by cultural artifacts and social norms shape our beliefs. Even the direction of our writing 
influences our perception of different movements in space14, and studies on bilinguals show that the use 
of different languages influences our judgment of duration of certain kinds of events15. Every day 
cognitive science teaches us about different ways in which cognition is very deeply embedded in our 
environment and shaped by our language and artifact use.  
While it is a fact that our way of thinking is socially embedded in many different ways, in order to 
argue that the relevant knowledge cannot be fully shared across cultures—as, for instance, Western and 
East Asian—an account is needed why such embedding is different from historical embeddedness of 
certain views expressed in a single (geographical) culture. In other words, we have to answer why 
comparing views of Democritus and Descartes is different from comparing philosophies of Plato and 
Confucius. Also, it is needed to show in what ways such embedding precludes mutual understanding on 
the level of philosophical notions and views, or what the specific cognitive constraints are that cannot be 
overcome. I believe that differences that exist are not insurmountable for the following reasons. Firstly, 
cultural influences on cognition are usually influences on lower level cognitive capacities, our visual 
perception, sense of space and time, and our emotions, and philosophical thinking involves dealing with 
highly abstract notions. We would certainly not deny a blind person ability to grasp ideas presented by 
Locke, so why should we deny this to a person whose visual perception is slightly different from ours. 
Secondly, one can object that there is one specific problem that is relevant to our present concerns, and 
that is a problem of translation which affects our understanding of abstract concepts and notions. The 
problem of translation involves the lack of one-one correspondence of terms, but such a lack of 
correspondence can be bridged by fuller explications and implicit definitions. A great deal of philosophy 
deals with its own distinct languages which refer to entities unperceivable by the naked eye, substances, 
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monads, entelechies, dynamis, propositions, modalities, sense data, selves, mental states, good, qualities, 
etc.; entities that are highly abstract, theoretical, and implicitly defined. Thirdly, cognitive impenetrability 
can be due to holding different core beliefs which are heavily influenced by tradition. But as we argued, 
practicing philosophy is one of the best ways to learn how to suspend our own core beliefs. And lastly, 
the cultural patterns of thinking mentioned above are such that they tend to influence our particular 
judgments about the value of particular pieces of knowledge, but not our ability to understand them. 
Thus, esoteric, enlightenment and embedded frameworks unjustifiably assume that philosophical 
knowledge of a certain culture has a defined method and that it is embedded in a way that disables true 
understanding for every impartial observer. Jenco rightfully notices that if we conceptualize knowledge in 
such a way the aim of cross-cultural philosophy cannot be fully reached. Nevertheless, her answer for 
these maladies, seems to assume the same assumption about the incommensurability of knowledge that 
we tried to dispute. Instead of seeing social embedding as an obstacle for true understanding, we should 
recognize it as an epistemic resource—a resource which offers us new perspectives with equal value. 
“Case based” vs. “subsumption under a general rule” kind of thinking16, when seen as stemming from 
facts about different social orientation becomes a further alternative and not a wrong way of using reason. 
I see the call for self-transformation through practicing different forms of life as too radical, and as 
introducing a threat of the merging of horizons instead of their multiplication. We should abandon the 
old ways of thinking about knowledge and embrace pluralism based on a multiply-grounded philosophy. 
                                                
*  I would like to thank Monika Kirloskar-Steinbach, Carl Mika, and Andrej Jandric for valuable comments 
and suggestions which greatly improved the manuscript. 
1 There are authors who believe that philosophy of philosophy falls outside of the scope of philosophy itself 
because of its second-order character (e.g. Heidegger 1956). 
2 Their views on the possible aims of philosophy will range from claiming that the purpose of philosophy is 
describing the world as it really is, building pre-scientific theories which are empirically untestable but with 
great explanatory power, providing grounds for moral conduct, conceptual analysis aimed at problem 
solving, providing alternative hypotheses, studying human condition, etc. 
3 For instance, they will take opposing stances on the issue of the importance or even existence of the so 
called “linguistic turn” of the 20th century philosophy. See Williamson (2008). 
4 The notion of family resemblance is used in Wittgenstein’s sense. See Wittgenstein (1953: §§ 65–71). 
5 Biologist or mathematicians certainly do not ponder on their subjects in the same way philosophers do. 
6 E.g. Ryle (1962). 
7 Results of the survey can be found at https://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl, and the analysis of the 
results in Bourget, and Chalmers (2014). 
8 Suspension of beliefs about things which are not evidently true practiced by ancient skeptics. See Annas, 
and Barnes (2000). 
9 These ideas resemble Richard Rorty’s conception of philosophical knowledge found in (Rorty 1979). 
10 I base this claim on personal experience and oral evidence. From the beginning of my philosophical 
education I encountered such explanations of prevalence of Western writings. Although these answers are 
grounded in different past traditions, today they usually present inherited opinions and unreflected stances, 
which nevertheless pervade philosophical community. 
11 Vaidya (2016). 
12 “Analytic cognition is characterized by taxonomic and rule-based categorization of objects, a narrow focus 
in visual attention, dispositional bias in causal attribution, and the use of formal logic in reasoning. In 
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contrast, holistic cognition is characterized by thematic and family-resemblance-based categorization of 
objects, a focus on contextual information and relationships in visual attention, an emphasis on situational 
causes in attribution, and dialecticism.” (Varnum et al. 2010: 9); see also Nisbett et al. (2001). In their 2010 
paper, Varnum et al. provide evidence to support the claim that differences in cognitive styles are 
connected to differences in social orientation (independence vs. interdependence).  
13 See Jenco (2017a), also Ganeri (2016). 
14 For instance, this fact about our perception was used in directing by Roman Polanski. He discusses his 
decision about a shot for the film Macbeth and says that it is not arbitrary from which side the English 
army should be seen advancing: “To the Western eye easy or successful movement is left to right, difficult 
or failed movement is right to left.” (Feeney, and Duncan, 2006) For the effects of writing direction on 
spatial cognition see Bergen, and Chan Lau (2012). 
15 See Bylund, and Athanasopoulos (2017). 
16 Case based thinking can be found as a mode of methodology in both Indian and Chinese philosophy, and 
it is seen as an alternative to Western request for generalization. Also, it is one of the traits of mentioned 
holistic pattern of thinking connected to the interdependent social orientation. See Furth, Zeitlin, and 
Hsiung (2007); Ganeri (2016); Nisbett et al. (2001). 
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“Are Certain Knowledge Frameworks More Congenial to the Aims of 
Cross-Cultural Philosophy?” A Qualified Yes 
 
LEIGH JENCO 
London School of Economics, UK (l.k.jenco@lse.ac.uk) 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
I want to start my response to this symposium by thanking my respondents for such provocative and 
productive commentary on my contribution. I hope in what follows to show how much of an impact 
their comments have had on my thinking and learning about the subject of cross-cultural 
philosophy—indeed, I found even their restatements of my own argument illuminating! I am also grateful 
to them, and to the editors of this journal, for the opportunity to expand and clarify my position in 
response. Given that space is limited, I will be following the respondents’ example by referring to my 
own previously published work where it is necessary to expand or provide further evidence for my 
argument. But I hope to offer enough detail here to support my position, which has now been enhanced 
thanks to engagement with such careful interlocutors.  
As I read them, these commentators raise three interrelated criticisms, which in what follows I 
will engage by reference to the specific arguments of each individual respondent. These three criticisms 
are:  
 
1) My claim that there exist four knowledge frameworks in which to discuss the project of 
cross-cultural philosophy is inadequate, because there exist other and possibly more nuanced and 
productive ways to carry out the cross-cultural project (Metz, Fuller); 
 
2) That the knowledge framework I recommend as most suited to the task of cross-cultural 
philosophy, what I call the “self-transformative” framework, would produce a uniformity of 
worldviews, and discourage the kind of pluralism or difference that cross-cultural philosophy 
intends to foster (Metz, Milojevic);  
 
3) The dialogic model that I rule out in my original response should be (re)interpreted more charitably, 
because despite my claims it can successfully support projects of cross-cultural philosophy (Kim). 
 
In general, I respond to these three criticisms by offering further evidence for my position that all 
knowledge—including most prominently the knowledge produced by contemporary professionalized 
academic philosophy—is necessarily situated; and that such situatedness can create problems of cognitive 
imperialism and “subalternity” when one form of knowledge is used to comprehend differently-situated 
knowledge(s). As such, I argue, these problems are fundamentally irresolvable by any means other than 
the “self-transformative” view. I join some of the respondents, however, in acknowledging that there may 
be different “levels” to interaction and that the knowledge we uncover or produce there can remain 
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valuable—stressing that such “value” of course begs the questions: valuable to whom, and under what 
conditions?1 
 
 
2 The Inadequacy Critique 
 
The first criticism of my essay is most saliently formulated in the responses from Thaddeus Metz and 
Steve Fuller. According to Metz, I neglected to consider a “fifth conception of knowledge” that can 
profitably enact cross-cultural learning, one based on the fallibilist assumptions that “there are objective 
truths to which no one has a monopoly” (Metz 2017b) and that Western philosophy contains at least 
some errors. On this basis, we can claim that “any long-standing epistemic tradition probably has some 
insight into the way things truly are” (Metz 2017b). Metz argues that this position is not simply a 
reiteration of what I call in my original response the “Enlightenment view,” because this position does 
not subscribe to a conception in which “knowledge is unitary” (Metz 2017b).  
I agree that Metz’s view is not an Enlightenment account, insofar as it does not make claims 
about rationality or progress associated historically with the European Enlightenment.2 Yet it is difficult 
to see how it does not rest on a claim about the unity of all knowledge if it also poses the existence of 
objective truth—and thus assumes some form of moral or epistemological progress. A fallibilist doctrine 
may tell us that we can never be in possession of such objective truths at any given time, but the mode of 
cross-cultural philosophy Metz advocates would entail that we are engaged in the process of trying to at 
least asymptotically to approach such truths. The “disparities” with which we might grapple on such a 
conception (Metz 2017b) are thus rendered not as true forms of difference (in which multiple 
heterogenous forms of being or claims about the world can co-exist simultaneously as legitimate rivals) 
but rather as instances of either right or wrong claims about the world, that must be resolved within the 
cross-cultural philosopher’s search for truth. This view bears a strong similarity to Enlightenment forms 
of knowledge, including the approach of JS Mill, who correctly saw such a view as perfectly compatible 
with British imperial activity in India. 
The main reason I do not accept such a view is because I have been convinced by the 
postcolonial insight that some forms of knowledge remain “subaltern” to other forms of knowledge. 
Subaltern forms of knowledge are those that cannot be represented by a dominant discourse or 
community of knowledge production in any way other than as an inferior form of knowledge. Another 
way of saying that is, we are capable of glimpsing the heterogeneity of subaltern knowledges, but not 
validating its premises as legitimate forms of knowledge production as we recognize it.3 Chakrabarty 
offers the example of how the past is narrated by the tribal Santal people of northern India, who ascribe 
agency to divine beings. Yet such narratives “cannot ever enter academic history as belonging to the 
historian’s own position,” because the very criteria of “doing good history” as a professional academic 
historian systematically prevent their articulation as “real” history. This is because academic history would 
identify the Santal themselves, and not ghosts or divine beings as the Santal claim, to be the “real” agents 
of history (Chakrabarty 2000: 105). This paradoxical outcome is precisely because (and not in spite) of the 
attempt by academic historians to take Santal history seriously. In other words, we may very well reject 
views of foreign others as “wrong” or “underdeveloped” when in fact (unbeknownst to us) it is the 
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constraints of our own worldview or discipline, and not some objective true state of the world, that entail 
such judgments. As Pratap Mehta has argued (persuasively, in my opinion), we can recognize that values 
are held for a reason, while also realizing that articulating those rationales to those who do not already 
share them may not be possible.4 
Such insights lead me to a profoundly circumscribed approach to knowledge, one that recognizes 
(as did many of my Chinese interlocutors, including Yan Fu—see below) that there may exist some 
worldviews we can never accept or even understand, short of adopting the broad social and cultural 
practices and relationships in which they are embedded. This transformation of entire ways of life—from 
marriage practices, to forms of inquiry about the natural world, to religious observance—as a means of 
comprehending or accessing alternative forms of knowledge was of course a key component of Christian 
and Islamic missionary practice throughout the world, as well as many other “civilizing projects” 
including the Confucian, Marxist and (I would add) liberal.5 Fuller is thus correct when he identifies such 
“proselytizing” as a possible fifth framework of knowledge within which cross-cultural philosophy might 
be carried out.  
However, I am not as convinced as Fuller (2017a) that this framework might work successfully as 
one “in which multiple cultures can transact their perspectives”. Fuller submits that such proselytism can 
and has worked both ways: “Enlightenment thinkers believed in proselytism—and expected to receive 
proselytism in return,” as evidenced by cross-cultural practitioners such as Leibniz (Fuller 2017a). Yet 
most historical interpretations of such exchanges see them not as instances of mutual learning but rather 
of Orientalist appropriation.6 The study of the “Orient” in some ways was motivated by a critique of 
Eurocentrism, but it was only because Europe and historical entities such as India were assumed to 
always-already be the same—whether in terms of values, institutions, or social structures—that the Orient 
had value for Europeans at all.7 Such assumptions, it seems to me, afford very little room for the kind of 
“reverse proselytism” or traffic in differences that Fuller optimistically portrays. Indeed, such Orientalism 
offers a historical example of how openness to learning from different traditions can sometimes, even 
unintentionally, mask an assimilationist project that rejects difference rather than legitimates it—one 
reason why claims to have learned something from a foreign tradition must be interpreted with caution, 
and interrogated carefully. 
Relatedly, I must push back against how Fuller portrays the reception of Western thought by late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century Chinese intellectuals, as a means of proving his point about 
esotericism. To reduce this rich and prolonged engagement to merely an instance of “defensive 
modernization” does a profound injustice to the creative and plural contributions of Chinese intellectuals 
and political elites during this period, for several reasons (as I argue in my book Changing Referents, where I 
offer a sustained defense of examining Chinese thought as a theoretical resource).8 First, the potential 
theoretical contribution of their discussions can be evaluated only on the basis of its substance, not its 
motivation; second, dismissing these thinkers as mere modernizers would fail to recognize that their 
debates ultimately produced, as I argue in my book, “one of the most sustained, syncretic, wide-ranging, 
and theoretically rich conversations in human history, on a topic of both popular and intellectual 
consequence: how, should, and can we learn from the thought and practices of others who occupy 
different spaces and times?” (Jenco 2015: 18)  
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As evidence, let me examine Fuller’s claim that Yan Fu and Zhang Shizhao engaged European 
texts, specifically Rousseau’s Du Contract Social, as merely “a platform for discussing matters that had 
previously lacked voice in Chinese culture” (Fuller 2017a). Obviously, both were deeply engaged public 
intellectuals who cared greatly about the fate of their society. But a quick comparison between their work 
and, say, that of similarly engaged intellectuals of the “Foreign affairs” (Yangwu) or self-strengthening 
(ziqiang) movements writing just 50 years before reveals how profoundly their Western learning had 
affected not only how they discussed social problems but also what they discussed, in which genres, and to 
what audiences. 9  Zhang and Yan, in particular, were unusually familiar with a broad range of 
contemporary European social thought (both were fluent in English and had studied in British schools) 
and each produced a hefty corpus of writings which evinced their deep conversance with such ideas.10 
These two thinkers personally introduced wholly new concepts into the Chinese lexicon that continue to 
shape Chinese-language knowledge production today: terms such as “society,” “culture,” and “logic” owe 
much to their efforts to transform the very language of social discussion, to enable it to say very different 
things than it ever had before. 11  As I have argued elsewhere, these profound and deliberate 
community-wide changes to how Chinese people thought and wrote constituted nothing less than a 
change of referents (bianfa)—a total shift in what they considered knowledge and how they produced it.12 
As Yan himself argues, these changes constitute a nearly unprecedented “fateful trend” (yun hui) that 
demand profound transformations in basic Chinese practices extending from personal relations, to law 
and government, to forms of learning. 13  I therefore do not believe that either Zhang or Yan 
demonstrates features of esotericism. I do, however, believe that Zhang and Yan present compelling 
examples of the kind of self-transformation I advocate, a point I noted in my original response and in my 
monograph devoted to their thought. I hope this further elaboration of their views here strengthens my 
argument.   
 
 
3 The Uniformity Critique 
 
My views outlined above help me respond to the second criticism of my approach, particularly as 
formulated by Metz and Miljana Milojevic: that my self-transformative framework ironically may threaten 
to “merge” instead of “multiply” horizons (Milojevic 2017a). Milojevic advances her critique specifically 
in relation to why our philosophical syllabi are almost exclusively Western. She argues that such exclusion 
is unjustified because philosophy is a task which inherently “seeks to better understand the world 
independent of our own particular perspective” (Milojevic 2017a), and as such its practice is constrained 
only by “the social and historical aspects of philosophical knowledge, and not in the cognitive abilities of 
differently-situated subjects” (Milojevic 2017a). On this basis, she argues that my “self-transformative” 
approach courts incommensurability, due to its insistence that we take seriously the embeddedness of 
knowledge in the social contexts—an embeddedness that she claims philosophy is by definition able to 
overcome.  
As should be clear from my response to Metz above, I operate with a very different view of 
knowledge, which—using terms from David Kim’s response in this symposium—contends that 
knowledge is anchored in culture rather than simply manifested in it (Kim 2017a). As a consequence, I 
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simply do not think it is possible for human beings to sufficiently transcend their biases, “suspend their 
core beliefs” deriving from religious or cultural traditions (Milojevic 2017a), or sufficiently operate by way 
of a purely “abstract, theoretical, and implicitly defined” language (Milojevic 2017a).14 Even if we accept, 
with Milojevic, that cultural influences on cognition are limited to “visual perception, sense of space and 
time, and our emotions” (Milojevic 2017a) we can nevertheless join feminists and philosophers of 
disability to recognize these as hugely important constitutive components of human life and society; that 
is, such capacities necessarily have a direct impact on how even the “abstract notions” Milojevic seems to 
favor in her philosophical method are formulated, chosen, discussed and proven.15 Recent debates over 
the “legitimacy of Chinese philosophy” (Zhongguo zhexue de hefaxing) have further demonstrated how 
“philosophy” as a discipline—including when defined as an abstract, transcendent 
methodology—imposes a very specific approach to knowledge, arising from a very specific historical time 
and place, that may not be shared by, nor is necessarily capable of addressing or engaging, all globally 
situated modes of knowledge production.16 
That being said, my “self-transformative” approach can recognize such constraints while offering 
a clear way out of the trap of incommensurability: part of my point was to argue that social, cultural and 
other contexts are indeed tractable to individual and collective transformation and (re)interpretation over 
time, rendering new forms of knowledge accessible. Individuals can change themselves, but communities 
can also change (and be changed by) individuals to enable the production of new sensibilities, languages 
and structures that produce knowledge in certain ways rather than others. This is true both of 
historically-situated knowledge, and culturally-situated knowledge—both of which, as Milojevic points 
out, share similarities in terms of their distance from the philosopher (although it is worth noting that the 
degree to which “we moderns” can comprehend historically situated knowledge is not as settled as 
Milojevic seems to assume.17) I would agree with Milojevic that we should see social embedding as an 
“epistemic resource—a resource which offers us new perspectives with equal value” (Milojevic 2017a). 
But I am not sure this epistemic resource can be fully actualized or validated without some lived 
experience of, and reflection on, the social embedding itself. I am not thus claiming that my 
“self-transformative” framework can enable us to access or comprehend all knowledge, for the simple 
reason that not all forms of social embedding will be available to us, whoever we are, located in our 
particular times and places. Nor am I claiming (as Kim rightly notes) that every alternative tradition 
requires the self-transformation process in a totalizing way—although our success in producing 
knowledge will turn on how it is evaluated in the community to which we think we are contributing. But 
in contrast to thinkers such as Charles Taylor, who argue that due to such embeddedness we can at best 
forge a third space or “language of perspicuous contrast,”18 I do believe there is much greater capacity 
than is usually thought to transform ourselves to actually learn from other societies and bodies of thought, 
rather than only contrast our present state with them. 
However, both Milojevic and Metz argue that philosophy offers us a uniquely privileged position 
in which we can survey a wide variety of perspectives and arguments. In embracing the need for social 
embeddedness, they say, I am rejecting the possibility of occupying such a privileged position and thus I 
reproduce the very constraints on knowledge that comparative philosophy is trying to overcome. In 
Milojevic’s (2017a) case, comparative philosophy should rather involve “suspend[ing] our core beliefs” to 
understand different forms of knowledge, facilitated by “fuller explanations and implicit definitions” that 
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bridge the lack of correspondence between them (Milojevic 2017a). In Metz’s (2017b) case the task 
should rather involve changing our minds when presented with “objective truths to which no one culture 
has a monopoly” (Metz 2017b). But as I said already in my responses to both Metz and Milojevic, I do 
not think such approaches realistically grapple with the problems of power inequality and particularity 
that saturate all knowledge production, producing problems such as subalternity. The pluralism that they 
each present as a desirable feature of philosophy may, from a different point of view, be simply the 
imposition of another kind of uniformity. For Metz, this is the uniformity of “objective truth,” albeit 
globally rather than parochially distributed. For Milojevic, this is a uniformity of abstraction, achieved 
through the sacrifice of the very “core beliefs” that in my view are precisely what comparative philosophy 
should be capable of addressing. 
To explain further, it might be helpful at this point to distinguish between transformations of 
communities and transformations of individuals—a distinction that was not always clear in my original 
response. Transformations of individuals in the way I describe does not necessarily portend the 
uniformity of an entire community precisely because communities, defined as those who produce 
knowledge intelligible to their fellow community-members as such, are internally diverse. Although they 
may share (uneven and overlapping) criteria that governs what constitutes knowledge, what communities 
produce is not a uniform set of information but merely the conditions of mutual intelligibility—according to 
which new members can produce meaningful knowledge recognizable as innovative, relevant, and useful 
(rather than deviant, irrelevant or useless) to other members. What I have in mind is something that takes 
the form (if not always the substance) of modern academic disciplines, in which transcultural and 
transnational individuals communicate—and argue—together in a likely unevenly shared language about a 
roughly shared set of concerns, even as these “overlap with practices and ideas sustaining intelligibility in 
a variety of other centers, each with diverse membership criteria.”19 So, in so far as academic disciplines 
such as philosophy may evince any form of pluralism, so too would each of these communities, which 
would fracture and proliferate as individuals seek to gain or produce new knowledge. Pluralism would 
exist both within and alongside them.  
 
 
4 The Charitable Re-Interpretation Critique 
 
This brings me to the third and final criticism of my essay: might the dialogic approach I reject have more 
value for the project of cross-cultural philosophy, including my “self-transformative” framework, than I 
claim? David Kim articulates these concerns most poignantly. Unlike Fuller or Metz, who begin from 
slightly different orientations, Kim seems to agree with my claim that knowledge, including philosophical 
knowledge, is embedded in backgrounds and institutions that sometimes make its travel to other contexts 
difficult. To Kim, cross-cultural dialogue need not dichotomize people into “self” and “other,” because 
“the underscoring of a distinction between self and other is part of a generic phenomenological 
conceptual machinery and is not intended to imply alienated social relations” (Kim 2017a). Understood in 
this way, it is both necessary and unavoidable in the very formation of those self-transformative 
commitments I encourage (Kim 2017a).  
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I would resist the idea that a mere phenomenological account does not carry important and 
necessary consequences for how we organize our social relationships, because every interaction of 
knowledge, even abstract knowledge, necessarily takes place on specific terms through specific 
institutions that privilege some and marginalize others. But I take Kim’s point that there may be instances 
in which dialogue can play an important role in familiarizing us with knowledge to which we would 
otherwise have no access. But this is true only of some kinds of knowledge, some of the time. It may not 
work when we can (as I explained above) “glimpse the heterogeneity” of a subaltern account but remain 
unable to grasp its meaning or claims to truth. So, I think Kim is right that dialogic engagements produce 
knowledge—not something I ever denied. The issue at stake is whether dialogic engagements are 
sufficient to produce knowledge recognizable as such to the differently-situated individual or community 
we are trying to engage. The answer, I think, is generally no. Short of self-transformation, we will, in 
Orientalist fashion, continue to produce knowledge for ourselves—even if we claim that the motivation 
or content of that knowledge comes from elsewhere. Farah Godrej’s recent call for plural “existential 
immersion,” cited favorably by Kim as an example of how “the cultural embeddedness thesis” can be 
wedded to “an inclusive pluralistic methodology” (Kim 2017a), is a case in point. First, such an approach 
paradoxically affirms the importance of historical and cultural contexts while claiming they can be readily 
and repeatedly transcended (thus rendering context irrelevant).20 Second, it is formulated explicitly as a 
means of expanding disciplinary knowledge for “us”—that is, professionalized comparative political 
theorists and philosophers—not as a way of fundamentally displacing our own terms of enquiry.21  
But there is another way of understanding Kim’s critique, and it opens an exciting new avenue to 
explore. Might it be the case that some forms of knowledge require different “levels” or forms of 
engagement? In my original essay, I tried to indicate that there do exist such levels, namely the four 
“frameworks” I sketched. Some of my comments above (and elsewhere) about the partial and 
overlapping nature of the self-transformation of individuals and communities also speak to this possibility. 
But I take Kim’s response to be asking something a bit different and more radical. Could it be that certain 
kinds of claims or beliefs or values or traditions pose different kinds of requirements for engagement? 
That is, might we need to do away with the very idea that there is one “best” framework for doing 
comparative philosophy, and cling rather to the possibility that different situations require different 
approaches that may displace us from our starting points more or less radically? Such a position is behind 
my claim in the latter part of my original response that even the project of “cross-cultural philosophy” 
itself, from a certain perspective, constitutes a unified field of knowledge that must be interrogated to 
reveal how it promotes certain forms of knowledge while remaining blinded—or denying legitimacy—to 
others. But Kim (2017a) takes this further: he mentions such possibilities as decolonial critique, 
political-structural comparisons, and others.  
I am convinced by this point, and look forward to (may I say?) future dialogue with all of my 
respondents about how we can realize this possibility. My only hope, however, is that as comparative 
philosophers (and political theorists) we do not become so preoccupied with method—or with talking to 
each other—that we fail to engage in a substantive and long-term way the very bodies of thought we 
hoped to include in the first place. 
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1 One final caveat. Although my topic for this symposium was cross-cultural philosophy, it will quickly become 
clear that I am not a philosopher. I was trained as a political theorist, with closer ties to fields that 
emphasize context and particularity—such as intellectual history, anthropology, and area studies—rather 
than to philosophy, which tends to emphasize abstraction and generality. But I hope that my argument will 
not only be clear, but also resonant, across such disciplinary boundaries. 
2 It is worth noting, however, that David Kim’s response in this symposium does identify something like 
Metz’s view about comparative philosophy (in which “comparative philosophy […] turns out to be a study 
of different local or cultural manifestations of an underlying, standpoint-independent, unitary body of 
knowledge”) as a form of the Enlightenment view (Kim 2017a). 
3 I have been influenced in this formulation of subalternity by Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000) and Sanjay Seth 
(2007, 2008). 
4 Mehta (2000: 625). 
5 Steve Harrell (1995) argues for the inclusion of Confucian and Marxist “civilizing projects” alongside 
Christian ones; for an example of what I would argue is a liberal attempt at cross-cultural proselytization, see 
March (2009). 
6 The classic argument is of course Edward W. Said, Orientalism (1978); for a more recent examination of such 
exchanges, and their impact on comparative study and area studies, see Dutton (2005: 89–125). 
7 Thomas (2010: 655–56). Here Thomas is basing her argument on the work of Orientalists such as William 
Jones (1746–1794), Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829), and Max Muller (1823–1900). 
8 Jenco (2015: 17–20). 
9 For more detail of this historical transition, see Huters (2005). 
10 For information about their respective backgrounds, see Schwartz (1964); Bai Ji'an (2004). It is important to 
note, however, that both Yan and Zhang altered their positions over time; here, I am speaking primarily of 
their positions circa 1895–1918. 
11 This claim has become accepted wisdom among historians of modern China; for specific examples, see Liu 
(1995); Kurtz (2011). 
12 This is the (admittedly quite ambitious) argument I pursue in Jenco (2015). 
13 Yan Fu (1986: 1, 3). 
14 Views such as those of Milojevic have been contested many times even within the modern discipline of 
philosophy (not to mention anthropology, history and other cognate disciplines) so I do not think my claims 
here and above are all that unusual. But for additional evidence, see Gadamer (1989); Taylor (1985); Pitkin 
(1972). 
15 For just a sample of how such capacities influence political philosophy, see for example Krause, (2008); 
Chambers (2003). In his response, Metz (2017b) also notes that he views emotion as “a source of moral 
knowledge.”  
16 For English-language overviews of this debate, see Defoort (2001); Defoort and Ge (2005); for a historical 
examination of how “traditional Chinese knowledge” was forced into the specific disciplinary terms of the 
professionalized modern discipline of philosophy, see: Makeham (2012). 
17 Such was the debate initiated by Quentin Skinner’s classic intervention: “Meaning and Understanding in the 
History of Ideas,” (1969); it is continued by postcolonial theorists: Seth (2008); indeed, as many modern 
Chinese thinkers recognized, even what constitutes the historical past is itself subject to interrogation and 
transformation in light of the connections present communities may cultivate with it; see e.g., Jenco (2015: 57, 
Chapters 3 and 7). 
18 Taylor (1985: Vol. 2, 125). 
19 Jenco (2015: 225). 
20 As I note of Godrej’s argument elsewhere: “if history and culture are relevant to the production of 
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knowledge […] then not all perspectives can be inhabited at once […]. We are led back to the same 
question: how might embedded knowledge travel meaningfully across the communities thought to contain 
it?” (Jenco 2015: 47). 
21 Godrej (2009: 151, 159); for further discussion, see Jenco (2011: 27–59). 
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Eurocentrism or Sinocentrism? The Cultural Grounds of  
Cross-Cultural Philosophy 
 
STEVE FULLER 
University of Warwick (s.w.fuller@warwick.ac.uk) 
 
 
Jenco’s response to her critics, including me, reveal fundamental value differences concerning the nature 
of cross-cultural philosophy itself that deserve an airing, especially given her “Sinocentric” vision of the 
field.  
I assume that cross-cultural philosophy would not exist, were it not for imperialist ambitions, for 
which proselytism is the vanguard intellectual activity. Moreover, I don’t simply mean modern European 
imperialism but also the background imperial activity that provided the richness of, say, Herodotus’ 
Histories, Aquinas’ Summa contra Gentiles and Ibn-Khaldun’s Muqqadimah, three rather different expressions 
of what I take to be the prehistory of cross-cultural philosophy. What I take to be essential about 
imperialism is that the desire to “recognize” other cultures extends beyond the weak sense of 
acknowledging their existence to the stronger sense of incorporating them into one’s own culture. 
Whatever else, this move implies that the aspiring imperialists see sufficient value in the “subaltern” 
cultures to try to arrive at some common standards by which the two sides of the cultural exchange might 
not only be compared but also ultimately function as a single unit. In this respect, imperialism is an 
exercise in socially constructing the universal.  
While cross-cultural philosophy is perhaps not imperialist by design, it wouldn’t get off the 
ground if there were no prospects of comparing cultures to mutual benefit. Put in terms that Jenco 
herself might appreciate, she doesn’t take sufficiently seriously the rather specific conditions under which 
cross-cultural philosophy is made possible. After all, two cultures that encounter each other may simply 
remain incommensurate, thereby licensing actions that range from disinterested neglect to casual 
obliteration. This is how humans have historically regarded the social arrangements of other animal 
species—at least until the animal rights movement. Imperialism may be many things but it’s not that. As 
Hegel and Marx realized, exploitation involves a much more robust sense of mutual recognition.  
Of course, postcolonialists are correct that imperialism imposed a hierarchical relationship on the 
encountered cultures, which justifies use of the term “subaltern.” However, this hierarchy should be 
understood as a net product of the relationship rather than some uniform expression of dominance. After 
all, imperial operations typically halt once the imperial power finds their maintenance too costly. And 
while various subaltern uprisings have certainly contributed to the end of historical forms of imperialism, 
in most cases the imperial power dictates the moment of its retreat. Put bluntly, the imperialists come to 
lose faith in the viability of their own universalist project—perhaps justifiably. But by the time that 
happens, a very sustained cross-cultural exchange will have occurred which alters fundamentally the 
self-understanding of all concerned. Moreover, this exchange is the product of both the 
“self-transformation” that Jenco stresses and the proselytism that I stress. In fact, I see them as two sides 
of the same coin. 
Now, Jenco probably doesn’t like this relatively sympathetic understanding of imperialism 
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because her own Sinocentric account of cross-cultural philosophy places overriding value on respecting 
the discreteness of cultures, and so the very fact that imperialism entails a reduction of cultural difference 
is problematic for her. But it’s not at all clear that cross-cultural philosophy needs to be committed to 
reinforcing the differences between cultures. It could well be a universalist project. Of course, the terms 
on which such universalism is forged remains an open question—and there’s much to learn from 
imperialism’s mistakes. Nevertheless, it is often forgotten that the original Liberal version of British 
imperialism aimed to create an international free trade zone, once the natives had the proper institutions 
in place. Had imperialism run its full course, that’s what the Commonwealth would be today. Interestingly, 
albeit perhaps quixotically, Brexit has recently revived just such dreams. 
One doesn’t need to take the imperialist project entirely at face value to realize that, as a 
profoundly capitalist endeavor, it was against the essentializing of all cultures—including the British one. 
I make this point because so much of the postcolonialist rhetoric about “difference”” is really a call to 
essentialism by the backdoor, in response to capitalism’s corrosive effects on all cultural distinctiveness. 
For the true capitalist, “culture” is ultimately just a synonym for “protectionism” (e.g. Friedrich List, the 
German economist who influenced early US economic nationalism), if not “rent-seeking” (which was J.S. 
Mill’s verdict on India after having worked for the East India Company).  
The “solid” to which Marx was referring when he said “All that is solid melts into air” was a 
strong sense of cultural identity, which in the nineteenth century was morphing into national identity. 
This feature of capitalism both horrified and fascinated Marx—fascinated, because Marx himself was 
interested in dissolving the essentialism of class identity, which capitalism not only left untouched but 
reinforced at a global level through imperialism. However, as Lenin subsequently theorized, imperialism 
accomplished the first task of World Communism by removing the cognitive barriers associated with 
cultural difference, which had prevented workers positioned similarly with regard to the means of 
production from seeing each other as engaged in a common struggle. This was the so-called “global 
division of labor,” which after it failed to inform a global revolution and its intellectual champion Leon 
Trotsky was sent into exile and Marxism retreated into the academy, fueled the imaginary of 
world-systems theory.  
Postcolonialism has been largely about running interference on this narrative, which ultimately 
sees universalism via the creative destruction of essences as world history’s direction of travel. Once again 
differences in starting value assumptions matters in how one assesses the universalist narrative. Like both 
the capitalists and the Marxists (at least when they were a serious political force on the world stage), I am 
comfortable with the prospect of attenuating cultural differences to the point that they become branding 
devices, market signals or—in the Marxist case—bases for spontaneous self-organizing contributions to a 
collective global effort. Postcolonialists like Jenco appear to believe that this is a fate to be avoided at all 
cost. But in so doing, they risk failing to respect the dynamic character of the human condition, in which 
one’s future is not tied to some nostalgic memory of a collective past, à la Benedict Anderson’s “imagined 
communities.”1 This is not to deny that the past is a resource—indeed, it is capital, nothing more and 
nothing less. It need not permanently anchor one’s sense of identity. 
Lest Jenco think I’m simply spouting an ideology of British cultural supremacy, it is worth 
recalling the significant history of resistance to utilitarianism and economic rationality more generally 
from within Britain. Whatever else, imperialism was not the imposition of distinctly “British values” on 
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the rest of the world—notwithstanding that’s how things appeared to Germans when they and the British 
saw each other as rivals. On the contrary, imperialism imposed values that were historically alien (aka 
“modern”) which nevertheless enabled the British state to pursue certain expansionist policies. A clue to 
this mindset may already be found in Jeremy Bentham’s original legislative reforms, which were designed 
to “rationalize,” largely by replacement, the cumulative case-specific wisdom of common law that had 
informed English jurisprudence for centuries.  
Cultural studies emerged as a mode of academic resistance—expressed as a reaffirmation of 
working class customs, guild labor and protection of the commons—at an opportune moment, namely, 
the postwar period, when imperialism was in its death throes. In the hands of some early advocates, such 
as E.P. Thompson, it verged on nostalgia for a pre-capitalist past. But even at the height of imperialism, 
Benjamin Disraeli had coined the phrase “One Nation Conservatism” to reposition the Tories as the 
party that identifies “British” primarily with the inhabitants of the British Isles—and the culture that 
binds them together—rather than simply a “made for export” ideology of global reform, which was how 
he cast the policies of his Liberal opponents. Even today the appeal to “one nation” in the face of the 
potentially divisive pressures of globalization remains a potent part of Tory rhetoric, which can guarantee 
to attract a substantial portion of working class voters. 
My point here is that the postcolonial critique of universalism as the imposition of one or a few 
European cultural horizons on the rest of the world—“Eurocentrism”—is too simplistic to be credible. 
Whatever imperialism supposedly “imposed” was imposed on Europe too – by design, not merely as an 
unintended consequence. It’s worth recalling that the founding work of cultural studies in Britain was 
written not by Stuart Hall about postcolonial resettlement culture but by Richard Hoggart2 about the 
culture of the native British working class, which had been long neglected and derided by elites of all 
parties as “backward.” But notwithstanding this cultural studies backlash, the desire and capacity to 
change one’s own culture is necessary for any robust sense of “cross-cultural philosophy” to get off the 
ground. Imperialism certainly provided the material conditions for that at a global level, albeit in a 
ham-fisted and arguably reckless way. The upshot has been that while former colonial cultures struggle to 
recover their imagined precolonial identities, the British—especially the English—also struggle to figure 
out who they were before imperialism. In this respect, Brexit is a cri de coeur.  
But in the end, has this generalized flux in cultural identity been such a bad thing? No, I say. And 
here I perhaps most disagree with Jenco’s Sinocentric approach to cross-cultural philosophy. 
Cross-cultural philosophy is facilitated by a willingness of all parties to consider that what they currently 
believe or possess may be worthy of exchange. Capitalism—and by extension, both imperialism and 
Marxism—have been historic facilitators of this attitude. Yes, this “learning experience” has happened 
under conditions that leave much to be desired. Nevertheless, these apparently suboptimal conditions 
have been justified by both imperialists and Marxists as constituting the very conditions of freedom 
itself—namely, the freedom not to have to reproduce one’s own past in the future.  
To be sure, this claim deserves further scrutiny. In any case, it is difficult to see how Jenco’s own 
Sinocentric starting point would lead to anything other than a truncated sense of cross-cultural 
philosophical traffic. I will put to one side whether an explicitly Sinocentric account of cross-cultural 
philosophy is usefully assimilated to the discourse of “postcolonialism” and/or “Orientalism,” given the 
degree and nature of European interference in China. (I doubt it.) However, it is clear, as Jenco herself 
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helpfully says, that she presupposes—thanks to her Chinese interlocutors—a “profoundly circumscribed 
approach to knowledge.” This is because China’s cultural identity is defined by an unusually strong sense 
of rootedness in land, blood and language. Admittedly this is impressive, considering the amount of space 
and time for which a consistent Chinese (Han) identity can be plausibly claimed. Indeed, if any culture 
deserves the label “essentialist” with regard to its own self-understanding, it is China. But this is not really 
the most perspicuous model for cross-cultural philosophy, is it? 
Thus, I’m less impressed than Jenco by the sophistication with which early twentieth century 
Chinese intellectuals considered the cultural relevance of Western sources. That’s precisely what one 
would expect of a defensive modernization strategy conducted in an esoteric key. Even if Jenco sees how 
Western arguments and turns of thought steered the Chinese intellectuals into culturally uncharted 
territory, it doesn’t follow that the non-intellectual Chinese public understood matters in those terms—let 
alone that it radically changed Chinese cultural self-understanding in any sustained way, even if it 
succeeded in changing particular policies. I have no doubt that Zhang and Yan—the two Chinese 
intellectuals of most concern—changed their own minds quite significantly through their encounters with 
Western philosophy. So, yes, they engaged in Jenco’s “self-transformative” process in that narrow sense. 
But this was basically an internal conversation, not something that deserves to be called “cross-cultural 
philosophy” in any robust sense, given the relatively limited presumptive capacity to change Chinese 
self-understanding as a whole. Perhaps this last point helps to explain the violence of the 1966–76 
“Cultural Revolution”?  
                                                
1 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983). 
2 Richard Hoggart, The Uses of Literacy: Aspects of Working Class Life (London: Penguin, 1957).  
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Dialogical Comparison: Reconstruction without Circularity and Contributions to 
Self-Transformation 
 
DAVID H. KIM 
University of San Francisco (kim@usfca.edu) 
 
 
I appreciate Leigh Jenco’s thoughtful reply to my response and the opportunity to continue the 
conversation. As I understand the foregoing exchange, I share many of the concerns and endorse some 
of the key ideas articulated in Leigh Jenco’s account of congenial epistemologies.  
In her lead essay, two elements particularly interested me: a case against the dialogical model 
being sufficient for the aims of comparative philosophy, and a case for epistemic deference and 
transformation before an alternative, especially subaltern, tradition of thought. These are connected 
because the dialogical model, on her account, facilitates a subtle kind of insularity rather than vulnerability, 
transformation, and border-crossing: one may seek out an alternative tradition primarily to better 
articulate, justify, answer, or enrich one’s own originary questions or positions, rather than being open to 
being transformed by it and changing one’s philosophical core. As I have mentioned before, I have 
learned much from Jenco’s work. In the brief remarks that follow, I offer two sets of considerations that 
might clarify and refresh my earlier concerns and push the discussion a bit further. First, I explore the 
idea that in some cases the dialogical approach may be sufficient. Second, I suggest that we gain 
methodological insight by focusing on the actual and potential intimate links between the dialogical and 
the self-transformative models, something that is potentially obscured by focusing too much on the 
insufficiency of the dialogical model. 
 
 
1 On the Insufficiency of the Dialogical Approach 
 
I agree with Jenco that the dialogical framework is insufficient for comparative philosophy as a whole. As 
I suggested, and as Jenco also affirms, we need a harmonized panoply of methods in order to compare 
the many kinds of philosophies that exist, including ones outside of the “West” and “East,” and the 
dialogical approach is but one resource. So, for our purposes here, let’s narrow our focus upon those 
comparative projects—for example, ones involving the Confucian or modern hybrid Confucian traditions 
that Jenco considers—in which the self-transformative approach and the dialogical perspective may vie 
with each other for methodological centrality. 
Like many influenced by postcolonial or decolonial perspectives, I too regard conditions like 
subalternity or coloniality as having serious epistemic aspects and implications and that dialogical 
accounts typically underestimate and undertheorize these ideas. Moreover, I am persuaded by Jenco that 
such underestimation manifests in most of the leading dialogical accounts in the kind of subtle insularity, 
entrenchment, or self-encirclement that she compellingly describes. So, we share much ground. Yet I 
hesitate to go as far as to say that the dialogical perspective itself is ensnared in this way. Two issues give 
me pause. First, what is it about the dialogical approach that necessarily commits one to remaining within 
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one’s originary philosophical core? It is true that the task of conceptual bridgework between traditions by 
means of dialogical inquiry is often subsumed within the potentially insular goal of only improving and 
always returning to or circling back upon one’s philosophical starting point. But I see no contradiction in 
such conceptual bridgework being subsumed within the unbounded goal of pursuing metaphysical or 
ethical truths wherever they may be found, which implies a vulnerability or transformability before the 
claims (and rituals) of another tradition. Surely one can do dialogical comparative philosophy with a 
one-way ticket, as it were, which implies that it is not of necessity insular or perpetually circling back upon 
itself. Second, given the distinction between intelligibility and veridicality, between understanding a claim 
and believing it to be true, couldn’t even insular forms of dialogical comparative philosophy meet some 
minimum standard of comparative philosophy? Someone bred upon Aristotelian or Kantian philosophy 
might engage with Confucian philosophy without being open to being transformed by the latter, yet still 
understand much about Confucian philosophy while critiquing or rejecting much of it. It is not uncommon 
for comparative philosophers to regard the entire li-qi framework of neo-Confucian metaphysics, like that 
of Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming, to be both false and convoluted. And yet, they are doing comparative 
philosophy, perhaps well even, without any desire to be transformed by that tradition. Jenco notes that 
not every case of comparison requires self-transformation. It would be helpful then to know when it is 
necessary and when not.  
In sum, I do not think the dialogical model as a model is insufficient on account of being necessarily 
insular. Put another way, it can be in principle reconstructed to avoid the pitfalls that Jenco has identified. 
In addition, even insular instances of the model may in some cases actually meet some minimum standard 
of comparative philosophy. 
 
 
2 On the Vital Connections between the Dialogical and Self-Transformation 
 
Even if Jenco is right that the dialogical account is insufficient for the aims of comparative philosophy in 
most or all contexts, it seems not only necessary but important in a variety of ways for one account that 
she does regard to be adequate, namely her self-transformation account. I think dialogical inquiry has an 
intimate and vital link to self-transformation that can be underappreciated if the focus is too much on 
rejecting the sufficiency of the dialogical model. Put another way, the self-transformation account is 
already and deeply harmonized with important elements of the dialogical model, and we gain distinctive 
methodological understanding in exploring this.  
Laying out the particular ways in which the dialogical is necessary and important for 
self-transformation can be illuminating. I noted a small handful in my initial response. First, we need 
dialogical inquiry to understand enough about another tradition to make an informed choice about whether 
to commit to self-transformation. For example, one would need to learn some basic ideas about, say, 
Confucianism’s concept of the self, social constitution, and a specific set of roles and virtues distinctively 
highlighted by Confucianism. Second, we need such inquiry in order to manage or shape the extent of the 
self-transformation. For example, if one thinks that Confucianism is patriarchal, then dialogical inquiry 
can illuminate the lines or obstacles a feminist must negotiate in the transformational landscape. And 
third, we need dialogical inquiry to conceptually extend the knowledge gained in self-transformation. For 
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example, one can spend a great deal of energy thinking through the neo-Confucian debates about li and qi 
in one’s basic metaphysics. I think there is another element to add that I neglected in my initial response. 
A fourth consideration is that we need dialogical inquiry to make sense of the very non-rationalistic rituals 
that Jenco says are necessary for self-transformation. We need it because rituals are not self-interpreting. 
Their meaning arises out of a larger constellation that is partly conceptual and hermeneutical, which 
suggests another way in which dialogical inquiry is necessary for self-transformation. The upshot is that 
necessary and sufficient conditions aside, the dialogical must be given varied and important roles to play 
in the self-transformation account, and this could be underscored in our collective effort to synthesize 
methods that facilitate comparative philosophy.  
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Why Objective Truth Is the Ally of Social and Epistemic Justice: A Reply to Jenco 
 
THADDEUS METZ 
University of Johannesburg (tmetz@uj.ac.za) 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In an article published elsewhere in this symposium, I critically engage with Leigh Jenco’s (2017a) 
suggestion that there are four basic conceptions of knowledge prima facie relevant to showing that one 
can learn from a foreign philosophical tradition and her claim that one of them, her self-transformative 
conception, makes the best sense of this judgment. Specifically, I advance a fifth conception of 
knowledge that appears relevant, and I argue that it does better than Jenco’s approach. According to my 
framework, what makes best sense of the idea that philosophers from one tradition often have something 
to learn from those in another one1 is the combination of metaphysical objectivity and epistemological 
fallibility.  
On the one hand, suppose there are objective philosophical facts, ones that obtain independently 
of the propositional attitudes of human individuals or groups. On the other hand, suppose that it is 
difficult to access these facts, such that certainty about philosophical matters is almost never forthcoming 
and it takes a lot of rational reflection by many people over a long span of time in order to make headway. 
Suppose, moreover, that any long-standing philosophical tradition, roughly one that has put in sustained 
enquiry over centuries, has some insight into the objective philosophical facts, which means that one’s 
own tradition lacks a monopoly of epistemic access to them and holds some incorrect views about them.  
This combination of objectivism with fallibilism, I maintain, best explains the idea that 
philosophers in one intellectual culture have strong reason to consider the views of philosophers in 
another if they want to expand their knowledge. One’s intellectual culture could always be mistaken just 
because of the objectivity of the pertinent facts, and it is likely to be mistaken about them in the absence 
of systematic exchanges with other cultures that have engaged in substantial rational reflection on them 
and, chances are, thereby acquired some knowledge.2 
In her response to this position, Jenco (2017b) contends that it is insufficient to account 
adequately for the intuition that various philosophical traditions have an equal standing and that traditions 
other than one’s own are not to be considered inferior. In addition, according to Jenco, an appeal to 
objective truth on the part of one epistemic culture is unavoidably oppressive, or overly risks being so, 
with regard to another one.  
In this brief reply, I argue that an appeal to objective truth about epistemic and moral 
justification in fact makes the most sense of Jenco’s concerns about inegalitarianism and oppression. 
Objecting to arrogant expressions of cultural superiority and imperial, colonialist, and related ambitions 
consequent to them probably commits one to an objectivist framework according to which these ways of 
treating people are really unjustified.  
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2 Objectivity as Oppressive? 
 
One frequently encounters the suggestion that making a claim to objective knowledge objectionably risks 
legitimizing colonialism, paternalism, and related forms of oppression. One thinks of self-righteous 
Christian armies marching off to forcibly convert heathens or European missionaries out to civilize 
natives. Jenco (2017b) remarks that my view that there are objective facts to which no one culture has a 
monopoly, thereby requiring multicultural engagement in order to make substantial progress toward the 
truth, “bears a strong similarity to Enlightenment forms of knowledge, including the approach of JS Mill, 
who correctly saw such a view as perfectly compatible with British imperial activity in India.”  
There is no denying that those in a position of power have often been, and no doubt will 
continue to be, inclined to try to justify their exercise of it over others by claiming to be in possession of a 
putatively objective truth. That, however, does not mean that there is no objective truth to be 
apprehended.  
For an analogy, consider that Charles Darwin’s theory of the origin of the human species was put 
to unfortunate use by some thinkers who, for instance, suggested that it entailed letting the poor die off. 
However, the misuse of a theory does not mean that it is false or even epistemically unjustified. For all we 
can tell, Darwin’s theory is true; and it is true objectively, i.e., in virtue of mind-independent biological 
and historical facts (upon which an overwhelming majority of those who have studied the evidence have 
recently converged), as well as universally, such that someone who disagreed with the theory would be 
making a mistake.  
The point applies more broadly. Although some people might say that they are uniquely aware of 
an objective fact and seek to justify oppression in the name of it, it does not follow that there is no 
objective fact. It does not even follow that they are not actually aware of it.  
What follows are instead two things, I think. First, one should be epistemically careful when 
claiming to know an objective truth in which others have some stake or when holding a belief that could 
lead to actions that affect others. One need not double check one’s evidence that, say, one has a headache, 
but there might well be reason to take extra precaution when making a claim about how the human race 
originated or what the best way to live is.  
A second lesson is to be morally careful. Even if there are terrific grounds for thinking that one is 
aware of an objective truth, does that knowledge really license coercion, denigration, and other forms of 
disrespect in order to get others to believe it or to live in accordance with it? The answer is presumably 
“no”; it is perfectly coherent to maintain that one knows something, say, about human nature or values, 
that is objectively true but to deny that such knowledge authorizes the use of force against others.   
In fact, the claim that it would be wrong to use force against others in the light of objective 
knowledge is itself a claim that is plausibly objectively true, or at least implicitly believed to be such upon 
being made! Jenco is contending that British imperialism in India was unjust. Indeed, her claim is that it 
was unjust even though some people, such as Mill, thought it was not. But to make such a claim is, I 
submit, naturally (though, I acknowledge, not necessarily) understood to be asserting that British 
imperialism was objectively unjust and that Jenco knows at least this one objective moral truth whereas 
Mill and those like him did not. In short, her claim that British imperialism is wrong is best justified by 
the kind of knowledge framework I am advancing and that she is rejecting.  
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On what other basis can Jenco object to the imperialism of the British empire in the way that she 
does? How else to make good sense of the idea that Mill was incorrect or unjustified about the injustice 
of imperialism in India, except by positing something mind-independent about injustice that Jenco is 
claiming knowledge of while claiming that Mill did not have knowledge of it?  
The problem I am raising is one that applies to many relativists, post-modernists, and 
post-colonialists. Often scholars who describe themselves with these terms advance moral claims, about 
socio-economic or epistemic injustice, that they passionately believe, that they know are not believed by 
everyone, and that they advance as claims that others would be mistaken or unjustified not also to believe. 
And then they juxtapose this sort of moral orientation with the further claim that there are no objective 
moral truths (perhaps since appealing to objective moral truths purportedly occasions injustice). I am 
afraid I find this combination of views to evince a serious tension that needs to be addressed: if one 
maintains that others’ moral views are mistaken, then one is probably committed to thinking that some 
moral views are objectively true3 and to maintaining that the others’ views are objectively false.  
I am not contending that Jenco’s claims cannot sensibly be held together, but I need help to see 
how she is going to avoid incoherence. It would be revealing for Jenco to explain how her knowledge 
framework can underwrite her moral criticism of British imperialism in India in the face of disagreement, 
and to consider whether it can do so with as much plausibility as an objectivist one according to which 
such imperialism was really unjust, something that many societies have thankfully learned over time.4 
 
 
3 Objectivity as Inegalitarian? 
 
Jenco advances another, distinct criticism of my appeal to objective truth, which is that, even if it did not 
legitimate intuitively unjust socio-economic practices such as imperialism, it could not avoid epistemic 
injustice. The latter “cognitive imperialism” (Jenco 2017b) comes in two forms that Jenco mentions.  
On the one hand, Jenco points out that we might make a mistake and believe ourselves to be in 
touch with an objective truth or justified in a certain belief when we are not. She says, “we may very well 
reject views of foreign others as ‘wrong’ or ‘underdeveloped’ when in fact (unbeknownst to us) it is the 
constraints of our own worldview or discipline, and not some objective true state of the world, that entail 
such judgments” (Jenco 2017b).  
In reply, of course it is possible for one culture to be mistaken and to think that another one is 
incorrect when the latter is in fact correct. But that point is part and parcel of the fallibilist epistemology I 
am advancing. According to my view, there are objective philosophical truths to which any long-standing 
culture probably has some access. Implicit in this approach is that one’s own culture is likely mistaken 
about some things, that other cultures are likely mistaken about some things, and that it is difficult to find 
the mistakes without substantial cross-cultural engagement! Keeping this fallibilism in mind alongside the 
positing of objective truth should lead one to be epistemically careful when making knowledge claims of 
philosophical realities and to take other perspectives seriously as rivals.  
Epistemic care need not mean the constant suspension of belief, however. The prospect of 
mistake is no reason to categorically prohibit thinking something to be objectively true. The earth is 
round, dinosaurs lived well more than 10,000 years ago, and water is H20. We are not certain, are not 100 
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percent sure, of these scientific claims, but we are justified in taking ourselves to know these apparently 
objective truths despite others who might disagree. Analogous claims could well be forthcoming when it 
comes to issues of metaphysics and ethics, on the supposition there are objective facts about them. 
The other worry about epistemic injustice that Jenco discusses is that, upon pursuing (putatively) 
objective truth from within one’s own epistemic culture, one could not avoid viewing other knowledge 
frameworks as implausible. She suggests that some rivals “cannot be represented by a dominant discourse 
or community of knowledge production in any way other than as an inferior form of knowledge” (Jenco 
2017b), and that my objectivist fallibilism means that views that conflict with one’s own are 
  
rendered not as true forms of difference (in which multiple heterogenous forms of being or claims 
about the world can co-exist simultaneously as legitimate rivals) but rather as instances of either 
right or wrong claims about the world, that must be resolved within the cross-cultural 
philosopher’s search for truth (Jenco 2017b). 
 
The example Jenco gives is of an indigenous people that explains many events by appeal to the agency of 
imperceptible, divine beings. From a Western scientific worldview in the 21st century, this people would 
be incorrect, if not also unjustified, to claim that the movement of planetary bodies is a function of the 
efforts of gods or angels (as medieval Europeans tended to do prior to Isaac Newton). 
For an initial reply, I wonder whether it makes it any better if one recognizes that, from this 
indigenous people’s perspective, the Western scientists would be mistaken. There is a parity of viewpoint 
(though of course only rarely a parity of power) upon positing an objective fact of the matter and the 
presence of at least two incompatible accounts of it. Both sides will view the other party as incorrect, and 
there is at least a kind of epistemic (even if not political) evenhandedness, here. 
It does not follow that one should make those with the rival view feel bad, or that the other view 
should be forcibly wiped off the face of the earth, or that it has no right to exist. These are issues about 
what to say to others or about them, and about which choices to make when relating to others, and so they 
concern socio-economic practices that would be (in my view, objectively) unjust. These issues are therefore 
distinct from the present matter of whether there is epistemic injustice simply in judging others to be 
mistaken. The present issue is about how rival views are “represented,” as Jenco states above, not how 
the people who hold the views are treated.  
Of course, if one believes that other people are systematically mistaken about a topic, and if one 
continues to believe that upon having taken epistemic care, then one is unlikely to go out of one’s way to 
consult them if one is interested in knowledge about it. Yes, one could be mistaken, as per the fallibilism I 
am advancing, and so one might have reason of some strength to consult them. However, it would be fair 
of Jenco to note that, at a certain point of perceived epistemic justification, my framework grounds little 
reason of knowledge pursuit to take this sort of rival seriously. 
At this point, I find myself willing to bite the bullet. Should geologists and cosmologists really be 
spending their time trying to engage with, say, members of the Flat Earth Society or other people who 
tenaciously hold beliefs that logically contradict each other about the nature of our planet? Would the 
scientists necessarily be epistemically unjust toward them in not citing them, not attending their conferences, 
and the like? Conversely, would there unavoidably be “cognitive imperialism” in the Flat Earthers merely 
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believing that the scientists are incorrect for failing to apprehend what they deem to be objectively true? My 
intuitive answers are “no” to these questions.  
Furthermore, as I mentioned toward the end of my previous article about Jenco’s conception of 
knowledge, there are probably epistemic reasons other than knowledge pursuit, particularly concerning 
the development of imagination, to continue to reflect on worldviews that appear to be false or 
unjustified, for all we can tell. And there are also reasons of morality and etiquette not to ignore, let alone 
denigrate, people whose worldviews seem to us to be false. If I were to visit an indigenous people and 
some of its elders shared their cosmology with me, I would be rude to be dismissive or not to listen at all. 
However, these matters again concern how to treat people who hold certain views, not the present issue 
of how to appraise the views that people hold. 
 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
At this point the natural suggestion to make on Jenco’s behalf is to go reaching for the first objection, 
concerning oppression. It might continue to seem as though one should not be inclined to believe others’ 
worldviews to be false since doing so would be likely to occasion disrespectful behavior, either small-scale 
dismissiveness or large-scale colonialism.  
However, I like to think that the exchange between myself and Jenco is a counterexample to this 
hypothesis. She thinks, or at least suspects, that I am (objectively?) incorrect about what knowledge must 
be like in order for cross-cultural philosophical engagements to make sense, and I have the same 
orientation toward her view. I submit, though, that our exchange has not involved epistemic injustice, 
oppression, or anything similar. By my lights we have instead exchanged competing views (about a 
mind-independent subject matter) with an eye toward learning from one another and with a respectful 
disposition. If we two intellectuals can do it, then why not two broader intellectual cultures?5 
 
                                                
1 In this brief essay, I set aside the issue of how to distinguish different philosophical traditions or 
intellectual cultures. The points made here about knowledge should apply, regardless of how one draws a 
distinction between two different epistemic communities.  
2 Another move would be to posit the existence of philosophical problems that demand consensus in order 
to be resolved, a move inspired by the work of Jürgen Habermas. This intersubjective approach, which 
contrasts with my objective one, is worth considering elsewhere. However, one reason I have for favoring 
objectivism is skepticism about the prospect of consensus ever being achieved among all rational enquirers. 
Another reason is that consensus, which has not yet been achieved, has not itself grounded the 
philosophical claim that consensus is necessary to resolve philosophical problems, meaning that there is a 
prima facie incoherence in the intersubjective position.  
3 Or perhaps intersubjectively true, i.e., in virtue of consensus, as per note 2 above.  
4 For one thorough articulation of such a perspective, applied especially to slavery, see Gilbert (1990). 
5 For comments on a prior draft of this article, I am grateful to the editors of the Journal of World Philosophies. 
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Three Aims of Cross-Cultural Philosophy and the Need for Self-Transformation 
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University of Belgrade, Serbia (miljana.milojevic@f.bg.ac.rs) 
 
 
First, I want to thank the editor, Leigh Jenco, and all co-symposiasts for making this thoughtful exchange 
of ideas possible. As the debate progresses it seems to me that our seemingly different views converge at 
some important points and that they are more similar than they look at the first glance. I have come to 
believe that most of the differences in our views stem from focusing on different aspects of the overall 
aim and role of cross-cultural philosophy and its different subjects. Let me elaborate on this in my short 
reply to Jenco’s response.  
The most common way to approach the topic about aims and methods of cross-cultural 
philosophy, which Leigh Jenco also seems to employ in her essay, is to address its difficulties and how to 
resolve them. Namely, given that cross-cultural philosophy strives to establish a dialogue between 
different traditions, it is thought that this endeavor encounters a number of difficulties which have their 
origin in the different situatedness of the researcher and the researched subject, 
which—interestingly—cross-cultural philosophy tends to address. More precisely, it is claimed that 
engaging in a fruitful cultural dialogue can be impaired by a potential inability to a) recognize1 or b) 
overcome2 methodological and conceptual biases of our own tradition. This kind of approach then seeks 
for ways which can help surpass such problems. Jenco’s own elaborate view stresses that we should 
assume the self-transformative knowledge framework, which would enable us to reach common ground 
and a proper understanding of differently situated philosophical traditions. Some of the reasons for 
endorsing such an approach can be found in the need to address and rectify the inglorious history of the 
earlier attempts at addressing philosophical knowledge of other cultures, but also in the need to specify a 
unique subject of cross-cultural philosophy, namely, cultural embeddedness of other traditions and how 
to properly understand it. 
I have decided to take a different approach and reevaluate the above described strategy which 
focuses on the importance of the difficulties mentioned. This does not mean that I choose to ignore the 
existing problems. Rather I would like to investigate their scope and importance. Namely, it may turn out 
that the cultural embedding of the researched subject and the specific perspective of a researcher do not 
pose the same kind of threat for an adequate understanding of different philosophical subjects and 
traditions. It may seem that this kind of analysis is contrary to the very essence of cross-cultural 
philosophy, inasmuch as it presupposes that some pieces of philosophical knowledge may not exhibit 
important influences of cultural embedding; if this turns out to be true, then, it seems to follow, that there 
will be no work left for the cross-cultural philosopher. But I believe that cross-cultural philosophy is not 
under a threat by this reevaluation, and that there is a more fundamental task of a cross-cultural 
philosopher than understanding particular forms of culturally embedded knowledge which I will soon 
address. Also, I am convinced that an approach to cross-cultural philosophy, which does not focus solely 
on its difficulties, is more productive. We are still living in a time of poor reception of cross-cultural 
philosophy. Presenting it as facing obstacles that can be resolved only in labor-intensive ways can offer 
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further excuses for not including it in general philosophical curricula.  
I have started from the comparison of history of philosophy and cross-cultural philosophy 
because they share some important traits. Most importantly, they share their difficulties in approaching 
their subjects which are historically and culturally embedded.3 In short, I tried to show that we practice 
and use history of philosophy, at least sometimes (for instance, when we focus on metaphysics and 
solving general philosophical problems), in ways that do not presuppose thorough engagement with 
historical and social contexts in which particular pieces of philosophy arose, and that there are no a priori 
reasons for not assuming a similar stance in cross-cultural philosophy. Assuming such a stance would 
neither mean that we are automatically giving up on “proper” cross-cultural philosophy, nor that in every 
case we should ignore or deliberately delete a wider context in which some philosophical hypothesis 
originated. It also does not mean that such a treatment will necessarily lead to the uniformity of 
knowledge and/or to an improper appropriation of philosophical teachings of other cultures. 
Namely, I believe that there is not a single level of relevant cultural embedding4 and that there is 
no single proper way to deal with the knowledge of other traditions. The answer about the depth of 
engagement and the level of the needed transformation of the perspective of the researcher will depend 
on the subject being investigated, the particular culture and the overall purpose of a specific project. I can 
only assume that there will be a continuous line on which we could position different pieces of 
knowledge with respect to their cultural embedding and the importance of this embedding for practicing 
philosophy. This pre-evaluation is of the utmost importance before deciding on the relevant methodology 
for properly understanding differently embedded pieces of knowledge, and I believe that this constitutes 
the main task of a cross-cultural philosopher.5 Positioning all knowledge on the very beginning of this 
line, where cultural differences are not taken into account, was a mistake of the colonial project, but we 
should be equally hesitant about placing most of the knowledge from other cultures close to the other 
extreme. After this evaluation6, the cross-cultural philosopher should strive to properly understand the 
other perspective (this might be called “the independent” aim), but no less importantly s/he should make 
his findings communicable to a wider audience of philosophers who should use them as valuable 
resources that can potentially change our perspective on the topics of their respective fields.  
I have come to believe that the differences in Jenco’s and my own views on the importance of 
self-transformation come from focusing on different ends of the abovementioned line. Jenco seems to be 
focused on political philosophy, whose subject matter is indubitably socially constructed and deeply 
embedded, and also on the “independent” aim of cross-cultural philosophy. In response, I have narrowly 
focused on a potential cross-cultural approach to metaphysics and on the role of communicating primary 
results for the purposes of pursuing general philosophical aims. Although we have focused on different 
extreme forms of cross-cultural philosophy we share some common assumptions. It seems that we agree 
that all knowledge is culturally and historically embedded, although we do not necessarily agree on the 
nature of relevance (relative vs. absolute) of this embedding for practicing philosophy. I also believe that 
we agree that there are levels of relevant embedding, Jenco notes that she is not claiming “that every 
alternative tradition requires the self-transformation process in a totalizing way” (2017b), but it seems that 
we see the importance of this stratification in a different way—I see it as the most important subject of 
cross-cultural philosophy, and as both culture and subject dependent. Given all this I still have my 
reservations about the self-transformative process if it is to be understood as a comprehensive strategy 
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for dealing even with deeply embedded knowledge, because I believe that in order for cross-cultural 
philosophy not to become self-serving it has to find a way to express its results in a language which will 
be understandable to a wider population of those not fully acquainted with other traditions, and who 
have to be educated in a proper way by a cross-cultural philosopher in order to introduce new 
perspectives in general philosophical discourse. In other words, in talking about the relevant methodology 
of cross-cultural philosophy we have to take all of its three aims into account: evaluation of the level of 
cultural embedding, understanding different perspectives, and communicating its results to a wider 
audience. 
 
                                                
1 The inability to recognize our own cultural biases in engaging with other traditions is historically reflected 
in the colonial project or in the idea of enlightenment. See Berger (2017); Jenco (2017a). Although this kind 
of unreflective approach to other traditions is part of a particular historical period, the inability to 
recognize our own cultural biases still presents a constant threat in the form of descriptive and normative 
chauvinism, or “cognitive imperialism” if we describe or value other traditions by the standards of our own. 
See Nussbaum (1997); Jenco (2017a). 
2 On the other hand, there is potentially even greater problem in engaging in cross-cultural philosophy, 
namely, that even if we are able to recognize our cultural embeddedness and our own prejudices that we 
would still be unable to overcome them because of the incommensurability of knowledge coming from 
different cultures (see Kuhn 1962); Wong (1989) which precludes us from gaining a common ground 
needed for mutual understanding and comparison of different views, or because of the impossibility to 
transcend our own perspective and our situatedness due to its constitutive role in our general cognizing. 
3 It could be objected that there are many important differences between them: history of philosophy cannot 
enter into a dialogue with the past so it is more similar to area studies than to cross-cultural philosophy, it 
usually follows one tradition with which it shares common assumptions, etc. I accept that these differences 
exist but insist that they are not important for the description of their, for this project’s, relevant 
commonalities. The two disciplines in question share the same difficulties in understanding their subject 
matter, and, both being sub-fields of philosophy, share their aim of explaining different perspectives on 
persistent philosophical problems which constitute a valuable philosophical resource.  
4  If we start from a premise that our thinking, language and knowledge are deeply influenced and shaped by 
our physical make-up, environment, culture and history, then we should simply claim, in the absolute sense, 
that they are embedded and situated in particular contexts in which they arise. When I use the phrase “level 
of relevant cultural embedding” I am referring to cultural embedding in a relative sense relevant for the 
practice of cross-cultural philosophy. Relative with respect to the already embedded perspective of a 
researcher (because we can expect that there will be shared cultural influences between the researching and 
researched perspective, where only those aspects of cultural embedding which are not shared present a 
difficulty to understanding), and relative to the specific philosophical project (as Lakatos [1970] 
differentiates between the internal and external history of science in accord with different scientific 
methodologies, we can differentiate between internal and external cultural influences in accord with 
different views on general aims of philosophy. See more in the next endnote). Also, we can expect that 
different philosophical concepts and problems will exhibit a different number and strength of connections 
with other forms of knowledge and beliefs specific for the culture in which they originated (e.g. those 
referring to socially constructed phenomena vs. those which tend to refer to more fundamental entities), 
and also that sometimes these bonds will be deliberately broken in some specific philosophies.  
5 It could be objected that this is an instance of circular reasoning, and that we have to be sufficiently 
acquainted with the other culture in order to evaluate the appropriate level of embeddedness. This does 
not have to be so. The judgment can be based on more general knowledge of history, cognitive science, 
language, etc. Also, it could be objected that the perceived relevance of a particular embedding will depend 
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on the presupposed understanding of the aims of philosophy in general; thus, a threat of uniformity 
emerges. This is a valid objection and it asks for a more detailed answer. In short, in order to enter a 
process of comparison there have to be assumed commonalities. Different researchers will most probably 
choose different ones, which will hopefully open a discussion on the appropriateness of particular 
evaluations and interpretations, which will further deepen our understanding of the subject in question. 
6 It is important to note that even if this evaluation reaches conclusions—in an argumentative and 
responsible way—that some parts of another tradition’s thoughts are not significantly culturally situated; 
these pieces of intellectual legacy will still form a part of the subject of cross-cultural philosophy insofar as 
they have to be evaluated as such by the cross-cultural philosopher. The subsequent use of such evaluated 
insights that does not include thorough investigation of the relevant other culture, will not be unreflective 
appropriation, but engagement with thoughtfully processed different perspectives and ways of thinking on 
some particular issue. 
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